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ABSTRACT
In mid-nineteenth century Britain, the dramatic disappearance of Sir John 
Franklin and his men led to a large-scale search conducted throughout the Arctic by 
sailing ships and steamers.  One such ship was HMS Pioneer (formerly the merchant 
vessel Eider), which was built as a topsail schooner with oscillating steam engine and 
later outfitted as part of an Arctic squadron.  The vessel was refit with heating apparatus, 
experimental rubber boats, and other contemporary developments, and serves as a 
valuable example of the mid-nineteenth century responses to the challenges and 
concerns of Arctic exploration.  This research focuses on the numerous contemporary 
written and visual depictions of the steamer and its voyage to explore HMS Pioneer’s 
context and importance in the shift from sail to steam. While HMS Pioneer was 
presented by contemporary accounts as a ground-breaking novelty, this research shows 
its place in a continuum with earlier Arctic ships, and highlights the conservatism of 
changes in rigging, outfitting, and social life on board.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In the mid-nineteenth century, improvements in manufacturing techniques and 
technology in Europe led to increasing use of steam engines on board vessels. One such 
example was the Eider, a screw-propelled topsail schooner built to carry cattle across the 
English Channel in 1847.  With the dramatic disappearance of Royal Navy Captain John 
Franklin’s Arctic expedition in 1845, the British Admiralty was pressured to send out 
their best resources to find these heroes.   The Eider was refit with hull reinforcements 
and a between-deck heating system as HMS Pioneer.  Featuring an oscillating steam 
engine and screw propeller, as well as a topsail-schooner rig, this ship represents a 
fascinating glimpse into the shift from sail to steam, highlighting a key phase in this 
early steam technology.  In addition, HMS Pioneer showcases the flexible nature of 
nautical innovation, with cold weather and harsh environmental conditions leading to 
adaptations in its engine and propeller.  HMS Pioneer drifted out of sight of history after 
Edward Belcher’s disastrous search expedition of 1854, but its place in the shift from 
sail to steam and in Arctic exploration makes its reconstruction a valuable case study in 
maritime archaeology.
Previous discussions of the technological shift from sail to steam have often 
failed to acknowledge the social, political, and cultural factors that influenced, and in 
turn were influenced by, the adoption of these engineering innovations (Leggett and 
Dunn 2012:1-3).  Rather than considering one “side” of the engineering/society equation 
as a causal feature, new forms of analysis focus on broadening the analysis to encompass 
these three factors and form a better understanding of the impact of steam technology 
(Leggett and Dunn 2012:7).  
This gap in historical knowledge is especially apparent in polar maritime history 
and archaeology, where most analyses focus either on a single aspect of polar 
exploration and shipboard life, be that technology, psychology, or nutrition (Campbell 
1982; McIntyre et al. 2008; Palinkas and Suedfeld 2008; Webster 2015).  Beyond that, 
2most analyses of the Franklin search-era ships overlooks the tremendous importance of 
steam vessels in the search efforts, focusing entirely on the sailing ships (Hodgetts 
2013). 
As pointed out in previous scholarship, ships were never simply “ready-made 
objects,” but living communities shaped by a multitude of forces during their voyages 
(Leggett and Dunn 2012:4).  During the entire process of rigging, outfitting, and sailing 
the ship, HMS Pioneer was affected by the ingrained meaning attached to ships in the 
Royal Navy (Leggett 2012:73-74).  This analysis will place HMS Pioneer within the 
historical context of the technological shift to steam, highlighting the adaptations made 
for Arctic service, as well as the social ramifications of these changes.  To do so, the 
many contemporary accounts of these voyages will be utilized as sources of information, 
along with archaeological finds from contemporary vessels.  Along the way, attention 
will be paid to contemporary attitudes and their effects on the way HMS Pioneer was 
designed, outfitted, and run during its two voyages to the Arctic.
Chapter II will address the historical background of the British Arctic 
expeditions, which culminated in the disastrous Franklin expedition and subsequent 
searches in the mid-nineteenth century.  Chapter III will discuss two specific searches: 
Horatio Austin’s 1850-1851 and Edward Belcher’s 1852-1854 voyages, both of which 
included HMS Pioneer and her sister ship, HMS Intrepid.  Chapter IV will critically 
discuss the sources of information on HMS Pioneer, including both contemporary 
descriptions of other vessels and accounts of the vessel itself.  Chapters V, VI, and VII 
discuss a theoretical reconstruction of the ship, tackling the areas of sail and rigging, 
propeller and engine, and heat and coal, respectively.  Chapter VIII grounds these 
analyses of technical specifications in reality by examining the combined effects of new 
technology and tough Arctic conditions on daily life for the crew and officers aboard. 
Chapter IX concludes with an examination of future research possibilities for HMS 
Pioneer.
3CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF BRITISH ARCTIC EXPLORATION
In the sixteenth century, as more of the world began to be explored by sea, 
European powers realized the potential of a route over the northernmost point of North 
America (Durey 2008:7-8).  At the time it was thought that the polar sea north of the 
coast must be passable year-round, an idea that was not disproved until 1909.  This 
Northwest Passage, also known as the Strait of Anian, would provide an alternate route 
to reach the Pacific and Indian Oceans, avoiding the Spanish and Portuguese-controlled 
Cape Horn or Cape of Good Hope.  British exploration of the Arctic region began under 
the reign of Elizabeth I, but proceeded slowly and sporadically until the 19th century 
(Williams 2009:15-17).  
In the nineteenth century, Britain enjoyed unprecedented peace due to its naval 
superiority, allowing focus to shift towards exploration.  Following the end of the 
Napoleonic Wars in 1815, Britain’s Navy faced increasing public discontent with high 
government spending.  At the same time, as a small island nation, the United Kingdom’s 
military strength primarily relied on a strong naval presence.  Focusing on the Arctic 
prevented the Navy from large losses in young, innovative manpower, while still 
providing opportunities for advancement and glory (David 2000:xvi).  The early to mid-
nineteenth century also saw a new focus on the need for accurate charts and maps of the 
world, including the Arctic (Durey 2008:6-7).  Sir John Barrow, a prominent figure in 
Arctic exploration during this period, extolled the scientific and academic advances that 
could be made, in “every way worthy of a great, a prosperous and an enlightened nation”
(David 2000:xvi-xvii).  The men who participated in these expeditions could look 
forward to double pay, as well as participation in heroic and patriotic struggles with 
nature that were incredibly popular (David 2000:8; Durey 2008:19-20).  In short, they 
would get “something better than glory” (Anonymous 1882:20).  All of these societal 
forces combined to see the nineteenth-century British Navy sponsoring increasing 
numbers of exploratory, mapping, and scientific expeditions into the Arctic regions. 
4Popular literature, entertainment, and thought about Britain’s place in the world 
were all part of this web of connectivity.  Increasing media presence in the lives of 
ordinary Britons meant that the public had ample opportunity to engage with the Arctic 
(however false or incomplete) with panoramas, tableaux vivant, lectures, books, 
illustrated newspapers, and museum exhibits (David 2000:131).  This new wave of 
Arctic exploration, shaped by earlier stereotypes, affected British perceptions about the 
dangers and wonder of the polar regions.
It was within this cultural milieu that the ill-fated expedition of Sir John Franklin 
took place.  Pushed by Sir Barrow, Franklin, wishing to make his mark upon history, 
was outfitted with the most well-supplied mission yet sent out to find the Northwest 
Passage (Durey 2008:11-12).  Franklin, by then nearing retirement at the age of 59, was 
chosen based on his past experiences leading overland expeditions into the region 
(Franklin and Richardson 1828; Franklin et al. 1823).  Previously, he had led one ship-
based expedition (1818) and two overland exploring parties in the Canadian Arctic 
(1819-1822; 1825-1827).  On this voyage, his ships were HMS Erebus and HMS Terror, 
built in 1826 and 1813, respectively (Durey 2008:13).  Both were former bomb vessels, 
built with heavy frames and scantlings, and further reinforced and sheathed at the bow 
before departure.  In addition, they carried small auxiliary steam engines and retractable 
screw propellers onboard (see Chapter VI for a complete history of steam power in the 
Arctic).  When the ships departed Britain in 1845, the public expected that they would 
find the Northwest Passage within the year (Durey 2008:13; Sandler 2006:77).
By 1847, both independent searchers and the Admiralty had begun to fear for the 
fate of Franklin and his crews (Ross 2002:58).  The Admiralty sent men and boats to 
Hudson Bay to prepare for a terrestrial search the next summer, while American captain 
William Penny searched by ship, launching the era of Franklin searches (Ross 2002:58). 
Between 1847 and 1859, 36 search expeditions traveled into the Arctic as part of the 
search for Sir Franklin and his men from Britain, the eastern United States, the 
Greenland whaling squadron, and Alaska (Ross 2002:65-67).  These voyagers hoped to 
find or rescue the “gallant squadron,” or to simply drop off supplies to all the ships in the 
5area (Osborn 1852b:213).  In total, 30 different ships (almost half of which took part in 
more than one expedition) took part in 36 “successful” Arctic expeditions by sea and on 
land from the Atlantic, Pacific, and Central routes (Ross 2002:66).  The end of the 
Franklin search, according to most authors, was precipitated by Francis Leopold 
McClintock’s discovery of bodies and artifacts from the doomed expedition in his 1859 
voyage with the Fox (Ross 2002:58).
By 1859, Britain had lost its naiveté regarding the “conquering hero” myth of the 
British polar explorer.  Due to extensive mapping and exploration of the region during 
the Franklin searches and following two decades, the Arctic was no longer an 
undiscovered country (Anonymous 1901:730).  The Northwest Passage, discovered 
during the Franklin search, could supposedly be traversed by steamer in one summer 
(Anonymous 1881b:359).  Exploration turned from mapping to a race to the Poles in 
vessels like the Fram (Anonymous 1912:316).  Commercial enterprises in the area, 
principally whaling and sealing, increasingly turned to less-expensive steam or diesel 
engines (Kjær 2008:270-271).  Still, many sailing vessels were still used, being 
repurposed for Arctic work, such as the Fox (Delgado 2009:26; Kjær 2011:14)
6CHAPTER III
A SHORT CAREER: HISTORY OF HMS PIONEER 
One of the early search expeditions was sent out by the British Admiralty in 
1850.  Seasoned naval veteran Captain Horatio Austin led two sailing ships, HMS 
Resolute and HMS Assistance, and two of the newly-introduced vessel type, the screw-
steamers HMS Intrepid and HMS Pioneer (Sandler 2006:100).  
When the Navy began preparing for Austin’s 1850 expedition, there was not 
enough time to build new ships.  Indeed, Lieutenant Sherard Osborn, commander of 
HMS Pioneer, described the whole process of outfitting and provisioning as “hurried”
(Osborn 1852b:11).  Instead, the Admiralty purchased two civilian ships to serve as 
screw-steamer consort vessels for the two sailing ships, which were the ‘main force’ of 
the Austin expedition (Osborn 1852b:16-17).  The Eider, built by R&H Green at the 
Blackwall Navy Yard in 1847, was a merchant craft (Lloyd's Register of British and 
Foreign Shipping 1847-1851; Lyon and Winfield 2004:232).  Based on Lloyd’s register, 
it was clear that the Eider was already outfitted as a steamer before its purchase in 
February 1850, rather than being a refit sailing ship as was done later by the Navy 
(Brown 1990:166).  HMS Pioneer was joined on the expedition by its sister ship, HMS 
Intrepid (formerly the Free Trade), also built by R.H. Green in 1847 (Admiralty 1847;
Admiralty 1848).  Both vessels belonged to the fleet of the Continental Cattle 
Conveyance Co., sailing from London to Oporto, Portugal and to Denmark. 
All of the vessels were outfitted for Arctic service with strengthened bows, 
double-planked decks, bulkheads, and doors, and heating pipes throughout the hulls 
(Osborn 1852b:32-34; Sandler 2006:253).  In addition, the propeller mechanisms of the 
steamers were modified to make it easy to remove them from the stern, preventing 
damage from crushing and shifting ice (Lyon and Winfield 2004:232; Osborn 
1852b:34).  The refits were completed by the end of April 1850.
In order to reconstruct the hull of Pioneer, reference was made to the dimensions 
given in official records, as well as the scale plans in Navy records (Lyon and Winfield 
72004:232).  The keel was 124 ft. 3 in. (37.87 m) long, with a hull breadth of 22 ft. (6.7 
m) and depth of hold of 14 ft. 7 in. (4.44 m).  From this, an estimated ‘gun deck’ (or, in 
Pioneer’s case, main deck) length of 143 ft. 6 in. (43.74 m) was calculated.  By applying 
the ratios seen in the scaled-down version of the official Navy refit plans (as reproduced 
in Lyon and Winfield 2004:232) to the known length of the deck, the hull lines were 
reproduced to serve as the foundation for the rigging reconstruction.
When describing his command after the 1850 Arctic expedition, Lieutenant 
Sherard Osborn described it as a “very handsome, smart-sailing” vessel (Osborn 
1852b:35).  He was also interested in describing Pioneer’s steam capabilities; Osborn 
believed that steam, with its ability to propel the ship independently of the wind, was the 
way of the future (Osborn 1852b:57).  The Royal Navy agreed with Osborn’s 
assessment: in the upcoming Crimean War, steam-powered vessels played a major role 
(Brown 1990:135).  At the time of HMS Pioneer’s career, the Navy was converting the 
fleet from sail to steam power (Greenhill 1993:11).  Thus, this topsail schooner can serve 
as an important case study in the transition period between the end of the age of sail and 
the steamers that would dominate the 20th century.  In addition, as an Arctic exploration 
vessel, HMS Pioneer offers the chance to explore the unique challenges and adaptations 
to the harsh environment. 
Although Osborn, the 27-year-old commander of HMS Pioneer, was optimistic 
about their chances of finding the lost explorers, they returned to a disappointed public 
only one year later, bringing back dispiriting tales of finding three graves from 
Franklin’s first winter (Osborn 1852b:35-36, 207).
8With no news of the Franklin expedition’s final fate, the Admiralty funded 
another voyage, commanded by Captain Edward Belcher and featuring the vessels from 
the 1850 expedition as well as HMS North Star, which served as a supply vessel 
(Sandler 2006:114).  However, conditions among the officers quickly deteriorated on 
this second voyage (Sandler 2006:115, 128).   Belcher argued with his officers and 
arrested Osborn and Lieutenant Walter Waller May (the latter served as an officer and 
artist on the expedition) (Markham 1875:35).  Against the advice of the other officers, 
who all felt confident in their ability to find Franklin on this voyage, Belcher ordered the 
abandonment of four ships in the summer of 1854; they all sailed back in HMS North 
Star (Sandler 2006:128).  This ended the short career of HMS Pioneer as an Arctic 
exploration and rescue ship.
9CHAPTER IV
SOURCES OF INFORMATION
A myriad of sources were examined for this thesis.  These included official and 
unofficial art produced during the voyage, newspapers, a crewmember’s journal, official 
reports, ship plans, Admiralty reports, and books published about the voyages.  Each of 
these sources has biases and missing information, but using them all, combined with 
archaeological studies of similar vessels from the same period allows for a more 
complete understanding of HMS Pioneer.  Each of these sources will be discussed, 
grouped according to their application in the following chapters: Chapter V, 
reconstruction of sail and rigging plan, Chapter VI, propeller and steam engine, Chapter 
VII, heating system and coal use, and Chapter VIII, daily life.
Sources employed to reconstruct HMS Pioneer’s rigging included contemporary 
accounts of masting and rigging (most notably: Brady 1848; Fincham 1843; Kipping 
1853; Young and Brisbane 1863), as well as archaeological accounts of similar vessel 
types (Hewitt 1998; Thomsen et al. 2008).  Secondary sources clarified where primary 
sources lacked information.  For information specific to HMS Pioneer and its sister ship, 
HMS Intrepid, Osborn’s memoir of the voyage and artistic depictions of the vessels 
were consulted (see Figures 1-5) (M'Dougall 1857b; M'Dougall 1857c; May n.d.-a; May 
n.d.-b; Osborn 1852a; Osborn 1852b).  
Contemporary depictions should be evaluated critically, since ship rigging was 
often depicted with varying degrees of accuracy, depending on the artist’s knowledge of 
ships.  Given that May served first as the mate in HMS Resolute, and subsequently as 
lieutenant in HMS Assistance, he likely had experience and familiarity with ship’s 
rigging (Markham 1875:35).  However, these images were produced for a non-naval 
audience that read popular and often sensationalized accounts of Arctic travel.  A 
common practice of the time was to make images for mass production in these books by 
engraving from a painting, a process that sometimes called for the original image to be 
simplified or otherwise altered (David 2000:36).  In addition, captains frequently altered 
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the rigging during the voyage, depending on the handling of the ship and current 
conditions.  See, for example, May’s depictions of HMS Pioneer earlier in the voyage 
and after the winter of 1854, showing that the mizzen mast was removed (Figures 4 and 
5).  
Historical and technical accounts by exploring ships’ crews, like the illustrations, 
must also be critically evaluated.  For example, Lieutenant Osborn of HMS Pioneer
harbored a desire to be a writer: he kept rough notes throughout the voyage, indicating 
that he probably intended to publish his experiences from the start (Osborn 1852b:38, 
109).  This was a common practice of his predecessors in exploration, although the 
accounts thus produced feature varying levels of precision and reliability (Osborn 
1852b:118).  
Osborn fully acknowledges that events or accounts in his book may be 
sensationalized, or, as he stated: “I have ‘piled the agony’ to make my work sell”
(Osborn 1852b:212).  Descriptions of landscapes and artifacts found by the search 
parties were heavily tinged with emotion.  However, Osborn also included 
acknowledgements of uncertainty when his notes became ambiguous (Osborn 
1852b:109).  In addition, the short time between his return from the voyage and the 
publication of these Stray Leaves from an Arctic Journal (only one year) reduced the 
ability of the author to revise his account, which is why this version of the “Leaves” was 
chosen for review over a later publication by Osborne that combined his account with a 
copy of the Grinnell Expedition report and a summary of Sir Franklin’s life and tragic 
death, which revised passages based on new information (Osborn 1865:173).  As Osborn 
specifically noted that this passage was unaltered from the first (1852) edition, more of 
the account could have been changed, altering the original text. However, the text still 
has value to the nautical archaeologist: Osborn’s descriptions can be compared and 
contrasted with a wealth of other Arctic accounts from the same period.
Osborn explicitly wrote for an audience including Lady Jane Franklin, the 
strong-willed widow of John Franklin who pushed for and funded private and 
government-sponsored expeditions to discover the fate of her husband (Osborn 1852b:5-
11
6).  Osborn professed to regard Lady Franklin with “admiration,” calling her “noble” and 
“steadfast;” Sir Franklin was regarded as a hero, like a knight of old, by him, and this is 
seen in Osborn’s descriptions of finding the graves of three men from the Franklin 
expedition (Osborn 1852b:91).   Osborne hoped to be one of the explorers who 
conclusively either found or rescued survivors from the Franklin expedition.  Thus, 
Osborne had a vested interest in showing significant progress being made in the search, 
such as emphasizing the scattered remains and artifacts found.  
Osborne also wrote for a public eager to hear news of Franklin and bone-chilling 
tales of adventure in the north. Osborne was writing his arctic accounts after a long 
history of arctic explorer accounts, including works by Sir Franklin, Sir John Ross, and 
Sir William Edward Parry (Osborn 1852b:118).  Audiences had expectations about what 
kind of material they would read in these accounts, including references to ice, the 
lonely and stark beauty of the landscape, the terror inspired by natural disasters, native 
peoples encountered, and flora and fauna (Byrne 2013:21-22).  Thus, Osborne included 
all of these tropes in his narrative, as well as referencing previous works about general 
descriptions of life in the north (Osborn 1852b:118).  In addition, Osborne was very 
conscious of how technical his account was, and he glosses over potentially useful 
information for a nautical archaeologist, like the working of the steam engine, in favor of 
the general reader’s interest (Osborn 1852b:195).  He does direct the reader to other 
sources of information, such as “Admiralty blue books” that provide more detailed 
accounts (Osborn 1852b:164).  
As an officer, Osborn gives an account through an upper-class lens in his 
experience of shipboard life.  He emphasizes the equality and comradeship he 
experienced in the expedition by citing the opportunities afforded the Arctic officer to 
work and socialize alongside his men (Osborn 1852b:65).  However, class divisions 
were still maintained on this, a Navy expedition: men referred to officers as “sir” and 
were inspected for health and cleanliness daily throughout the winter (Osborn 
1852b:132).  On board HMS Pioneer, officer and crew quarters were separated by 300 
tons of coal, as well as separate eating locations and times (Osborn 1852b:33-34).  The 
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class divide between officers and men probably resulted in errors of omission in how 
routines or tasks were really carried out: for example, Arctic foxes were sent out in the 
winter with messages in the hopes of contacting the Franklin expedition; Osborne 
assumed that the animals headed off into the wilderness (Osborn 1852b:138).  As a 
“sub” (sub-officer, or lower-ranking officer, and therefore more likely to be confided in 
by crew), he was let in on the crew’s secret that they were re-catching and eating the 
messenger foxes.  After this, rules on fox-hunting grew stricter, and perhaps the crew no 
longer confided their secrets in the lieutenant.  Unfortunately, these mistakes or gaps in 
accuracy are impossible to discern in Osborne’ narrative since he would have no 
knowledge of them; comparison of accounts with crew journals, for example, show the 
common differences in crew and officer accounts (Unknown 1850-1851:3 January).
The Arctic Leaves of Lt. Osborn, although plagued at times by the melodramatic 
phrasing and its class and rank biases, has much information to offer on equipment and 
sailing techniques peculiar to the polar regions, such as ice anchors, wintering the ship, 
and “making the cannon.”  For the nautical archaeologist, this first-person accounts like 
these, in conjunction with government outfitting records, allows for the creation of a 
detailed list of the equipment on board one of these vessels.  However, even more 
importantly, Osborn’s narrative shows which supplies were actually used by the crew, 
such as the India-rubber boat mentioned in one brief passage, as compared to the 
frequency of the mention of ice-anchors (Osborn 1852b:40, 67, 193).  Finally, unofficial 
accounts like this, although lacking in the technical detail so loved by the ship drafter, 
offer insight into the relationships and communication between officers and crew and 
among the multiple search expeditions sailing in 1850-1852.
Reconstruction of the propeller and engines relied on Osborn’s accounts as well 
as Admiralty records and filed patents.  As the merits and limitations of Osborn’s 
accounts were discussed above, nothing more will be said about the Arctic Leaves, 
except to note Osborn’s vested interest in proving the superiority of steam power, 
leading to extravagant statements such as “they all were delighted with the performance 
of the steam vessels” (Osborn 1852b:57).  
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To obtain a balanced view of the situation, this author also consulted a journal 
written on board HMS Resolute during Austin’s expedition; this ship was commonly 
towed by HMS Pioneer during the voyage (Osborn 1852b:41).  The authorship of this 
account is unclear: a note at the beginning indicates that it belonged to a Mr. May, mate, 
who gave the book to William Harvey; a note in the last entry states that “This is the 
Resolute log Book By William Harvey” (Unknown 1850-1851:title page, 10 January). 
The hand for both of these entries is similar to the writing throughout, although in a 
different ink.  A Mr. May was mentioned by Osborn as “my kind friend,” indicating that 
he was likely an officer on HMS Resolute (Osborn 1852b:112).  William Harvey, on the 
other hand, served as the bosun’s mate onboard, a lower social position (Harvey 1853).  
One should also note that later portions of the book (a blank, unlined notebook, with 
marbled endpapers) were used to record various life events in the Harvey family, drafts 
of letters, schoolroom copied lines, arithmetic, and childish drawings, making the 
Harvey origin for the journal more likely.  
Analysis of the engines and other hull refits relied on Admiralty records and 
patents (Admiralty 1847; Admiralty 1848; Brown 1842), including both Admiralty 
surveys of the ships, conducted before purchase of the vessels, and shipyard drafts, used 
as proposed plans for refits and changes to the hull.   Both these sources are more 
technical than the published accounts and personal records discussed previously.  Thus, 
they are not restricted by the sensationalism that could plague personal accounts of 
Arctic voyages.  However, they are confined by content: the Admiralty was interested in 
recording only a narrow range of information about these vessels, and might ignore 
features or designs considered “standard” or otherwise beyond special notice.  In 
addition, these accounts discuss ideals, rather than reality.  That is, the ship plans and 
other notes proposed design changes and other refits: whether these changes were 
actually made onboard may be deduced from comparison with the written accounts 
mentioned previously, as well as cross-reference with archaeological ship remains from 
the same period.
14
In reconstructing the heating system and coal use on board HMS Pioneer, 
extensive use was made of patents filed by John Sylvester throughout the 1830s and 
1840s (Sylvester 1832; Sylvester 1835; Sylvester 1843; Sylvester 1845).  As sources of 
information, these were idealized versions of reality, like Admiralty records.  However, 
since this type of heating apparatus was just beginning in use, and was a treasured item 
during the long winter months, accounts of its use can be compared with accounts in the 
HMS Resolute journal, as well as accounts in the Illustrated Arctic News (see discussion 
below) and Edward Belcher’s accounts from its second expedition (Belcher 1855).  
Finally, reconstructing the experiences of daily life on board relied on 
comparisons between Osborn’s Arctic Leaves, the HMS Resolute journal, and analysis of 
the Illustrated Arctic News published on board.  The production of newspapers on Royal 
Navy ships had a long history, with examples known beginning in the 18th century, 
although the use of printed illustrations a new technology (Coppinger 2011:120).  
Detailed critique of the former two sources appeared above; see below for information 
about the context and limitations of the contemporary newspaper.
Two newspapers were in production on Austin’s 1850-1851 expedition as the 
ship crews wintered in the shelter of Griffiths Island: the Illustrated Arctic News and the 
Aurora Borealis (Osborn 1852b:121).  The Illustrated Arctic News (IAN) was based on 
the relatively new Illustrated London News (first printed in 1842), and published 
historical, instructive, moral, and satirical content as well as news from the other ships of 
the squadron (Cavell 2008:25).  During the Austin expedition, five monthly issues were 
produced, from 31 October 1850 to 14 March 1851.  Contributions were made by both 
officers and crew, and the periodical was edited  by Lieut. Osborn of HMS Pioneer
(Lieutenant Osborn’s name was misspelled by the publishers of the IAN) and Mr. 
George F. McDougall, second master of HMS Resolute (Osborne and McDougall 
1852:title page, 1).  Illustrations, including colored images, were produced by 
McDougall.
The Aurora Borealis, the other newspaper in production among the squadron, 
was not illustrated, and provided a publication opportunity for more literary endeavors 
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(Osborn 1852b:121; Osborne and McDougall 1852:5).  While the IAN was controlled by 
officers in HMS Resolute and Pioneer, the Aurora Borealis (AB) was edited and 
published by officers of HMS Assistance and HMS Intrepid.  As part of the friendly 
rivalry and competition between the ships, the editors of the competing newspapers 
sought the best articles and bemoaned when their Editor’s Box was not in “as flourishing 
a condition as that of our cotemporary[sic]” (Osborne and McDougall 1852:21).  The 
“Rory Bory,” as it was nicknamed, consisted of smaller sheets, with four pages in the AB
equivalent to one page in the IAN (Osborne and McDougall 1852:42, 57).
All articles in the IAN (and likely those appearing in the AB too) had to be seen 
and approved by the editors, both officers on their respective ships.  To avoid cries of 
favoritism or other conflicts over the journals, contributors were advised to place 
potential articles in the Editor’s Box, using disguised but legible handwriting and 
pseudonyms (Osborne and McDougall 1852:11).  While the main body of the articles 
was produced in manuscript form (handwritten), the large type for the headings, as seen 
on the playbills and other promotional material, was cut on board by the seamen 
(Osborne and McDougall 1852:31). 
This discussion of editors brings to the forefront a major bias inherent in using 
the IAN as a source of information about seafaring life: it was edited by officers.  
Osborn, for example, was in charge of HMS Pioneer, with 60 men (of whom, about 15 
were officers); he had a vested interest in suppressing the shirking of work and other 
more overt forms of mutiny (Osborn 1852b:33).  Thus, the “the censors” were the same 
people editing and publishing (Osborn 1852b:122).  Rebellious crewmembers, in turn, 
would likely have avoided putting pen to paper and writing down complaints for fear of 
reprisal and punishment. Unfortunately, the use of pseudonyms prevents the researcher 
from determining which articles (if any) were authored by crew as opposed to officers.   
In addition, the majority of articles present throughout the IAN were written by Osborn 
or McDougall themselves (S.O. and G.F.Mc.D.).  
Censorship and alterations to the original text were also made on shore, as was 
done in previously-published ships’ newspapers like HMS Hecla’s Gazette.  The 
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manuscript available for study is a facsimile of the original leaves, published in 1852 by 
Ackermann & Co. of London, by appointment to the Crown (Osborne and McDougall 
1852:title page).  As part of the publication process, “A few articles have been omitted 
for fear the bad taste” and “on the score of raciness” (Osborne and McDougall 
1852:preface).  This self-editing process in order to present a good face on the 
expedition to the public can also been seen in the subtle pronouncements that “every 
individual…enjoyed himself heartily and rationally” and “the fun grew fast & furious, 
tho’ never exceeding the bounds of propriety” (Osborne and McDougall 1852:28, 54).  
Here you will not find tales of drunkenness, lewd words, or other scandals; they did 
occur, though, as mentioned in the hungover Resolute journal’s author on 6 January, 
following the second Masquerade Ball (Unknown 1850-1851).
Finally, one must consider the content of the newspaper itself: the IAN was a 
newspaper published for entertainment.  Each issue generally consisted of a greeting 
from the editors, satirical pieces (covering some aspect of a sailor’s life and hardships), 
factual pieces (usually geographical or historical in nature), songs, and the Editors 
Portfolio (including descriptions of the past months’ major events, such as plays, etc.).  
Satire and caricature must not be taken at face value, but examined to find common 
themes in the seafaring life.  In addition, the IAN was influenced by British culture, as 
seen in the inclusion of Punch (a long-standing folk character). Accepting all articles as 
truth may result in errors.
17
CHAPTER V
RECONSTRUCTION: SAILS AND RIGGING
To reconstruct HMS Pioneer’s rigging, which was arranged as a three-masted 
topsail schooner on the Austin expedition, reference will be made to contemporary 
rigging and masting manuals (Brady 1848; Fincham 1843; Kipping 1853; Lever 1819;
Young and Brisbane 1863) as well as archaeological evidence from similarly-rigged 
vessels.  A yard and rigging plan were produced for HMS Pioneer (see Figure 6).
Sail-power
Although HMS Pioneer used steam power when the wind was too light or 
contrary, it was still primarily sailed in open waters (Osborn 1852b:15).  Steam power 
was still limited by the vast amounts of fuel needed to power relatively inefficient 
engines.  Thus, in the sliding scale between fully-powered steamers and auxiliary, 
Pioneer was best classed as an auxiliary steam-powered topsail schooner (Greenhill and 
Allington 1993:146).  Thus, it is prudent to examine the rigging and masting of this 
vessel in detail.
Masting the Ship
Contemporary rigging manuals acknowledged the problems inherent between 
combining sail and steam power, such as the need to replace much of the main-mast 
rigging with chain to prevent ropes catching fire (Kipping 1853:121).  One consistently-
noted challenge was the obstruction that spars became on a steam-vessel (Fincham 
1843:113).  Spars added weight to already heavily-loaded vessels, as well as providing a 
surface for wind to act against.  Vessels with high, large spars would have to expend 
more fuel and move slower against contrary winds.  At the same time, rigging had to be 
sent up quickly if and when the wind changed favorably in order to take advantage of 
their sailing abilities.  As Fincham notes, this results in a wide range of forms and 
proportions for steam-vessel spars (Fincham 1843:113).  His proportions are only a 
guideline, therefore, on the actual proportions used on auxiliary steamers of the time; his 
tables of measurements are extrapolated for all sizes of vessel based on mathematical 
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formulas based on smaller ships (Marquardt 2003:223).  Still, this does provide a useful 
starting point for reconstructing the rigging of a 19th-century vessel.
Throughout the description of the masting process, the reader is advised to see 
Table 1 for all relevant measurements, based on Fincham (Fincham 1843:122).  In 
addition, in order to clarify the position of the rigging in the final drawing, the mast-head 
fittings were simplified (leaving off, for example, the lower mast-head battens and 
gratings).  For detailed descriptions and diagrams, see Fincham (1843:209-210) and 
Kipping (1853:14-17).
The lower masts are the largest spars on the vessel, and have to resist the strain 
put upon them by the topmasts and topgallant masts, as well as yards and the weight of 
the standing rigging’s various blocks, deadeyes, and ropes.  The location in the hull of 
the masts was based on measurements from the navy’s scale plan.  However, the raking 
angle as measured from the horizon was not taken from the plans, due to the 
reproduction’s small size, which would compound any errors in the measured angles.  
Instead, mast rake was calculated from Kipping’s table for three-masted schooners 
(1853:5).
The greatest diameter of the lower masts is at the partner beams or deck line, and 
is in proportion to their length (Fincham 1843:152). Their smallest diameters are at the 
heel, hounds, and head of the mast (Fincham 1843:162).  In order to provide the most 
support with the least weight, masts were tapered by quarters, with the greatest decrease 
seen in the last quarter of the mast (Fincham 1843:164).  Without this, Fincham warns, 
the taper would cut across the grain of the wood where strain is still relatively high, 
causing the mast to sheer too easily.  The lengths of masts used in this analysis were 
based on a length on deck of 143 ft. 6 in. (43.74 m) (Fincham 1843:122).  Housed 
lengths were taken to mean the length of the mast extending below the deck, while 
hounded (length of the mast up to the hounds of the masthead) plus headed length 
(length extending beyond the masthead) was used to determine the total length of masts.
The bowsprit’s length, location on deck, and angle of steeve were drawn after the 
naval plans (as seen in Lyon and Winfield 2004:232).  This was decided after attempting 
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to draw the bowsprit as described by Fincham for the lower masts (Fincham 1843:234).  
However, the housed length and the total length were found to give an angle of steeve 
that was much too high for this low-masted vessel.  This disparity may have been due to 
Pioneer’s Arctic refit; it is known that the bow was heavily reinforced, and this could 
have entailed raising the prow in preparation for steaming into the ice.  Alternatively, 
Fincham’s method of calculating-up in size from known models may be less reliable 
than thought.
Since Fincham describes schooners as commonly employing both an upper and a 
lower cap, this was the method chosen at the lower mast-heads and bowsprit (Fincham 
1843:262, 267-268).  The length of topmast used to calculate cap dimensions was the 
length of the topmast (not including any subsequent poles) (See Table 2).  On the lower 
mast caps were set cross trees (two on the fore and main-mast, one on the mizzen) and a 
bolster for the standing rigging to drape over (Fincham 1843:210; Kipping 1853:14-17).  
Since the cross tree dimensions are supposed to be based on trestle-tree measurements, 
in this case the cross-tree dimensions were based on the lower cap size (Fincham 
1843:25).  Hounds were formed below the mast-head according to Fincham (1843:208).  
This very small mast-head arrangement was designed based on the contemporary 
images, which show no elongate trestle-trees (Figures 1 and 2).  In addition, it must be 
noted that while trestle-trees were described among the fittings for steamer mast-heads, 
not all steamers were schooner-rigged (Kipping 1853:120).
As described in Fincham (1843:113), steam-vessels were commonly outfitted 
with their topmasts and topgallant masts all in one pole.  Based on the consistent 
description of these upper masts as “poles,” it was decided to dispense with the fore-
topmast cap employed on larger ships at the join between the fore-topmast and the fore-
topgallant mast; instead, it was joined with a flared socket as seen with royal poles and 
topgallant masts (Kipping 1853:25).  Their large diameters were at the heel, while small 
diameters are placed at the hounds and head (Fincham 1843:152, 162).  They are tapered 
according to the same method seen in lower masts, although with smaller differences in 
diameter, this tapering produced less of an effect.
20
The jibboom was a small spar that rested on a saddle upon the bowsprit, 
extending forward as an attachment point for upper rigging (Fincham 1843:265-266;
Kipping 1853:22-23).  The dimensions of the jibboom, saddle, and placement of bees are 
as described in Fincham (see Tables 1 and 2).  The jibboom length, however, would 
have been added to by the addition of a flying jibboom.  In steamers, this would have 
been a jibboom and flying jibboom in one, since low headsails made longer versions 
unnecessary (Kipping 1853:23).
Finally, the dolphin-striker, also known as the martingale, was added below the 
bowsprit cap to the jibboom, perpendicularly to the bowsprit, to assist in holding the 
bowsprit down against upward pull from the rigging (Brady 1848:79).  Information on 
spar lengths for this piece is sparse, since its dimensions depended primarily on the angle 
of steeve (Brady 1848:322).  However, by looking at illustrations, it seemed that the 
ratio of length seen between the bowsprit and the martingale was about 1:0.75 to 1:1 (see 
Figure 2, especially).  When this was tested, the 1:1 ratio appeared too heavy and long 
for the size of the masts; therefore, a dolphin-striker length of 7.5 ft. (2.3 m) was 
estimated.  The large diameter for the dolphin-striker was based upon the ratio between 
length and diameter given for first and second class sloops (Brady 1848:321).  Tapering 
for the end was estimated as the same amount for the jibboom.
Yards
Yards are those spars designed to hold sails in the optimum configuration to 
catch the wind.  Yard measurements were taken from Fincham (see Table 4) (Fincham 
1843:120, 152, 163).  The yards were tapered in the same manner as masts (see above).  
HMS Pioneer had lower fore and main yards, fore and main topmast yards, a fore-
topgallant mast yard, mizzen boom, and fore, main and mizzen gaff yards.  Even though 
Osborn describes his ship as schooner-rigged (that is, with only fore-and-aft sails), it is 
clear from contemporary illustrations that it was a topsail schooner (Figure 3).  Looking 
at Figure 3, it appeared that the ship has a main topgallant sail as well, or at least a split 
main topsail, however, the authorship of the small plate is unknown and the depiction is 
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likely stylized.  Additionally, this yard is not shown in any other illustration, and is not 
mentioned for steam-vessels in any other source.
The yards were furnished with cleats in the center on either side of the mast, as 
well as with stops on the yardarms as rigging attachment points (Fincham 1843:275-
278).  In earlier ships, the yard-arms had cleats, but it was found that stops weakened the 
yard less and provided just as much support for rigging.  In the center of the yard, the 
surface would be made octagonal, and had wooden battens nailed to it for protection 
from damage (Kipping 1853:28-30).  Given that it was rare for HMS Pioneer to travel 
under sail in the Arctic (most of Osborn’s memoir focused on moving under steam, 
although this may be a result of his bias in wanting to report steam-power’s usefulness), 
studding-sail boom irons were not added.  In addition, boom irons (to spread 
studdingsails) were usually only place on fore-yards (Marquardt 2003:167).  The height 
of the lower yards below the masthead was calculated using Rule 89 (Fincham 1843:37), 
as shown below (see Table 4):
Main-mast heading=9/68*Depth
Depth=9/68*main-mast heading
Depth*1/17=position of yard below the mast head
The distance of the topsail yards below their mast heads was taken to be 1/9 the 
length of the topmast (here based on the length of the mast without the poles).  As can be 
seen in Table 4, the increasing relationship between the head of the mast and yard height 
allowed extrapolation for a relationship of 1/5 for the fore-topgallant yard height, since 
no proportion was given in Fincham (1843:37).
Fore-and-aft sails were spread using gaffs and booms, with the angled gaff 
raising the top of the sail.  All lower masts on HMS Pioneer featured a gaff.  The lower 
foremast did not feature a boom, since it would have interfered with the engine’s 
smokestack (Figure 1).  The mizzen-mast required a boom to spread sail aft; however, it 
was unclear if HMS Pioneer carried a main boom or not.  Unfortunately, contemporary 
iconography was unhelpful; either the fore-and-aft spars were not set up in the image 
(Figure 5), or the area was obscured with smoke or wintering gear (Figures 1 and 2).  It 
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was decided to not include a main boom to reduce the weight of spars carried on board, 
especially since the foot of the fore-and-aft mainsail could be extended via line to the 
mizzen mast.  This is in contrast to Figure 1, where a spar appears in the same area on 
the mainmast as on the mizzen.  However, this main-mast spar has a higher angle of 
attachment to the mast, more consistent with a gaff.   As seen in the illustration, smoke 
from the steam engine is pouring up into the mainmast head, carrying sparks and 
potentially damaging unprotected spars.  This spar most likely represented a gaff 
lowered on deck to prevent unnecessary damage.
Boom and gaff dimensions were taken from Fincham’s tables (Fincham 
1843:120).  To the lengths present there was added 4.5 foot (1.37 m) jaws on both gaffs 
and boom (Fincham 1843:280, 282).  These jaws were hooped and bolted to the tongue 
of the gaff or boom, with a semicircular end that fit half-way around the mast in question 
(Kipping 1853:31-32).  The spar would then be fastened in place with a single parral 
(Marquardt 2003:166).  The greatest diameter of these spars was taken at 4 ft. (1.22 m) 
from the inner end (outside the jaws) on the gaffs, while 1/3 of the way from after end 
for the boom (or driver boom) as described (Fincham 1843:152; Kipping 1853:32).  The 
smallest diameters were located at the outer and inner ends (Fincham 1843:163), and 
tapering was applied the same as masts and yards.
As based on Fincham (1843:37), the gaff yards were all set one diameter of the 
corresponding square-sail yard below them.  As for the angle formed by the gaff, a range 
of 25-30° above the horizon was acceptable (Fincham 1843:36).  Since fore-and-aft 
spars presented the least drag for the greatest effect in favorable winds, contemporary 
authorities recommended making the fore-and-aft sails as big as possible on steam 
vessels (Fincham 1843:113).  Initially, therefore, the higher angle of 30° was chosen for 
all gaff yards.  However, when adding the standing rigging, the amount of clearance 
needed between the ends of these yards and the stays necessitated lowering the angle for 
the fore- and main-gaffs to 25°.  The mizzen boom (on ships) was set 4 ft. 6 in. (1.37 m) 
above deck, and at an angle just high enough to clear the taffrail (Fincham 1843:32).
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Rigging: Standing Rigging
Once all of the spars were place on HMS Pioneer, the standing rigging was 
placed to provide support and stability for the masts and yards.  When determining the 
dimensions of rigging, principal rope dimensions were applied from Brady (Brady 
1848:340-363).  It is important to note that in the 19th century, rope sizes were reported 
in circumference; for this reconstruction, these sizes were converted to diameters (D = 
C/ π) Block, deadeye, and other tackle dimensions were taken both from Brady 
(1848:364-383) and Kipping (1853:132-136).
Shrouds were sets of heavy standing rigging supporting masts on either side, and 
were always the first rigging element laid on a mast (Kipping 1853:93).  On lower masts, 
they extended from the mast head down to the deadeyes (Brady 1848:44-45), passing 
over the cross-trees (Kipping 1853:93-94).  On steamers’ main masts, due to the heat 
from the engine exhaust, the upper third of the shrouds was made of chain instead of 
rope, with the shrouds bolting in to a chain looped around the mainmast (Kipping 
1853:121).  The deadeyes on the shrouds were, in turn, joined via lanyards to deadeyes 
set in the channel (a wooden shelf on the outboard sides of the hull that extended 
shrouds out at a greater angle).  These were then attached to chain plates and preventer 
plates to the side of the vessel (Kipping 1853:101-102).  Based on the number of shrouds 
seen in contemporary illustrations and on similarly-sized three-masted schooners, there 
were four pairs of shrouds on the fore- and main-mast, and three pairs on the mizzen-
mast (Figures 1 and 2) (Thomsen, Meverden and Jensen 2008:Section 7:page 2).  The 
shrouds were typically laid starting from the first pair (also known as pendant shrouds), 
extending down to run along the centerline of the mast (Lever 1819:25).  From there, the 
shrouds angled aft, with the extent of the channels determined by the number of shrouds 
and size of the deadeyes.  Based on archaeological evidence, chain plates for this size of 
vessel were typically around 3-3.5 inches (7.6-8.9 cm) wide and possibly 3 ft. 4 in (1.02 
m) long (Souza 1998:153; Thomsen, Meverden and Jensen 2008:Section 7:page 2).
 Topmasts also had shrouds, which essentially attached similarly to the lower 
shrouds, but extending from the head of the topmast to a deadeye located on the end of 
the lower-
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mast crosstree (Kipping 1853:94, 106).  As in lower shrouds, lanyards connected these 
deadeyes to deadeyes in the upper end of futtock shrouds at the lower-mast head, and 
from thence to futtock plates on an iron collar located below the hounds (Brady 
1848:57).  On large ships it was common to apply catharpens (also known as futtock-
staves) to the futtock shrouds; these staves would be pulled together via a lanyard to 
reduce the area taken up by rigging in the tops (Brady 1848:46).  However, on ships with 
lighter rigs (like steamers) this would be considered “unnecessary lumber aloft,” and was 
dispensed with (Brady 1848:57).
In placing the deadeyes, each one had to attach to the end of a crosstree.  
Accordingly, and based on contemporary images (Figures 1 and 2), two shrouds were 
placed on the main and fore mains, and one on the mizzen.  On the fore masts, the 
topmast shrouds extended to the head of the topgallant pole, rather than the topmast 
pole, as shown in Figure 1.
In order to provide access for sailors to ascend the masts and adjust sails, the 
principal shrouds were equipped with ratlines, or lines that formed ladder framing 
(Young and Brisbane 1863:303).  On the lower shrouds, these were placed over a sheer 
batten (also known as a shroud truck or side leader) (Brady 1848:382).  Since no 
dimensions were given for these, they were drawn as half the width of the channels, 
extending slightly fore and aft of the shrouds, so as to not interfere with the backstays.  
Ratlines were placed 15-18 in. (0.38-0.46 m) apart, or about the height of a lifted foot 
apart.
Next, backstays were placed over the shrouds on topmasts; backstays were not 
present on lower masts (Kipping 1853:102).  Kipping mentions both ‘breast’ and 
‘standing’ backstays, however, Brady states that breast backstays are not necessary for 
mast stability (Brady 1848:66; Kipping 1853:95).  Backstays were athwart-ship lines 
like shrouds, extending from the head of mast to the channel, attaching via deadeyes to 
the channel, behind the shrouds (Kipping 1853:95).  On illustrations of HMS Pioneer, it 
looks like the backstays extend from the topgallant pole, similarly to the topmast 
shrouds; nothing appears attached at the topmast pole (Figures 1 and 2).  Based on the 
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Osborn illustration, there were two pairs of backstays placed on the fore and main masts, 
and one on the mizzen.  Spacing between the backstay deadeyes and the shrouds was set 
at 8 in. (20.3 cm) (Brady 1848:67).
Finally, stays were placed that extended forward from the mast, matching the 
pull of the backstays (Brady 1848:56).  Stays were often accompanied by preventer stays 
(also known as spring stays) on heavy lower masts that acted as a fail-safe when rigging 
became worn (Kipping 1853:102).  Spring-stays (especially for light topmasts) were not 
always included in upper rigging.  The preventer/spring stay always attaches below the 
primary stay (Biddlecombe 1990:Plate IX).  Lower stays on ships extended from just 
above the shroud ties to outboard of the bowsprit saddle (forestay) or to an eyebolt in the 
deck (mainstay) (Brady 1848:54-55, 58; Kipping 1853:95).  However, this arrangement 
is untenable in a schooner-rig, where the gaff must be free to swing around the points of 
the wind for maximum efficiency.  With this configuration, the main and fore-gaffs, 
even when lowered to 25°, would still hit the stays when tacking.  Therefore, the main 
and mizzen lower stays must be arranged as seen in Kipping (1853:120) and Young and 
Brisbane (1863:490-491) (the foremast stay is the same as on a ship).  Therefore, the 
main-stay leads from the head of the main-mast to the head of the foremast, with two 
jumper-stays set up to an eyebolt in the deck aft of the foremast (Kipping 1853:120). 
These jumper-stays are attached on the lower end with blocks, so that as the fore-and-aft 
sail tacks, the appropriate stays can be loosed and tightened as necessary.  The mizzen 
mast simply has two jumper stays leading to an eyebolt, since it is much lower and 
lighter than the two masts forward.
Bobstays, in this period of chain, attached with hearts or deadeyes to a collar 
under the bowsprit to a plate bolted to the cutwater of the hull (Kipping 1853:102).      
martingale back-ropes.  The martingale stay fit from the end of the jibboom to the 
dolphin-striker, to pull the jibboom down against pressure from the headsails (Brady 
1848:72; Kipping 1853:109).  The martingale backstays (a pair) run from the dolphin-
striker (looped above the martingale stay) to inboard of the hull.
Attached to the jibboom and dolphin-striker were the martingale stay and
26
Finally, the last piece of standing rigging added was the foot ropes and stirrups, 
to form a working platform for crew out on the yards (Young and Brisbane 1863:156-
157).  Foot ropes would hang below the yards, with stirrups extending to hold the foot-
ropes in place (Brady 1848:81-82).  There were two to four stirrups per each side of a 
yard, depending on its length (Kipping 1853:114).  The foot ropes would hang about 3 
feet (0.91 m) below the yard, so that a man standing would have the yard at waist height.  
Foot ropes were placed on all square lower yards as well as the foretopmast yard 
(basically, any yard not outfitted with a halliard, see below for discussion).
Rigging: Running Rigging
Running rigging dimensions are based on the same sources as standing rigging.  
The interested reader is referred to Table 6 for running rigging and tackle dimensions.  
In addition, it should be noted that with standing rigging, descriptions of placement and 
features differs slightly between Kipping (1853) and Brady (1848).  In this instance, the 
Kipping description is regarded as more accurate, due to the audiences that were being 
written for: even though Brady wrote specifically about the rigging of steamers, he was 
primarily focused on an American naval audience; in contrast, Kipping is much more 
interested in iron-supplemented rigging (which was being used more frequently in 
Europe) and merchant applications.  Given that HMS Pioneer was first developed as a 
merchant, and her small crew size, Kipping’s descriptions were relied upon more heavily 
(Osborn 1852b:47).  However, Brady (1848) is used in reference to block sizes, given 
his specific focus on steamer-tackle.
Lifts were placed on square yards to allow vertical adjustment  of the ends 
(Young and Brisbane 1863:235-236).  An eye was fitted over the yard-arm-end, securing 
against the cleat, and looped through a single block at the top cap, in between the lower 
mast head and upper mast foot (Kipping 1853:114).  From thence, the line passed 
through the lubber’s hole (or equivalent) and was set up on deck.  On topyard and 
topgallant yards, the lift ends could also be tied to the futtock plates in the top (Kipping 
1853:115-116).  There was a pair (one for each side of the yard) on each yard.
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Braces extended aft from the yard-arms, and were used to adjust the fore-and-aft angle 
of a square yard (Young and Brisbane 1863:54).  Although, typically, the fore-brace 
would attach to the main-stay, due to the nature of schooner rigging (see stay discussion 
above), the fore-braces were configured differently on topsail schooners (Kipping 
1853:114).  As seen in Plate V, one option was having the fore brace tied to the foremost 
main stay, pass through a block, and then reattach to the shroud (Young and Brisbane 
1863:490-491).
Since the same problem of fouling with the gaff sail would result if ship-style 
braces were used on the main yards, it was decided to use the same attachment system 
for the main braces (Kipping 1853:114).
The foretopsail brace has its standing part attached to the topmast head (as seen 
on Plate V, not as described by Kipping), with the end running through a block on the 
yardarm, back to the topmast head, and from thence down to the deck (Kipping 
1853:115; Young and Brisbane 1863:490-491).  In order to prevent fouling with the gaff, 
the main topsail brace was rigged in the same manner.
Based on general schooner sail plans of the time, the foretopgallant brace 
extended from an eye on the yard-arm to a single tail-block on the mainmast head, and 
from thence down to the deck (Kipping 1853:117; Young and Brisbane 1863:490-491).
Halliards and tyes (or ties) were used to raise and lower yards along the mast axis.  The 
tye was the portion extending from the inner yard cleats, while halliards attached via 
blocks at the lower end to facilitate the ‘hauling up’ of the yards.  There were no 
halliards on the lower yards; these would be permanently fastened in place with chain 
slings and iron trusses around the yard and mast (Kipping 1853:115).  Larger ships (with 
larger yards) used double tyes (with a tye-block fastened on the yard).  In this 
reconstruction, double tyes were used on the foretopsail yard (since it is almost as long 
as the lower mainyard, and required more support), while single tyes (with only an eye 
around the slings) were used elsewhere.
The foretopsail halliard had its standing end tied to the mast head, with the 
running end passed through a tye block at the inner cleats, then up through a “bullock-
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block” at the after side of the mast-head assembly, then down towards the deck (Kipping 
1853:116).  This end then reeves through a double fly-block, down into a single block 
hooked into the chains of the main-mast, up again through the fly-block, and tied off 
onto the block when secure.
The main topsail yard and fore topgallantsail yard are rigged with single tyes.  
The standing end loops in an eye around the yard at the slings, up through a single block 
(or sheave hole in the pole mast) at the head, then down to a single fly-block and single 
block in the chains of the mast-head (sometimes these lower halliard blocks were 
dispensed with entirely, depending on the purchase necessary) (Kipping 1853:117).
Information in rigging treatises on fore-and-aft running rigging is even scarcer, since 
most manuals were concerned primarily with the sailing standard of the day: the ship.  
As such, the application of rigging on gaffs and booms is extrapolated from plate 
illustrations of schooners and descriptions of mizzen-rigging.  Once again, block 
measurements were taken from Brady (1848).
Throat halliards raised the fore-most end of the gaff.  The standing part of the 
throat halliard was positioned 8 in. (20.3 cm) from the forward end of the gaff (Fincham 
1843:282).  After its standing portion and a single block were attached here, the running 
end reeved through a double block under the lower cap, down through the single block, 
up again through the top block, and through a leader in the top (Kipping 1853:117).
The peak halliard worked in a similar fashion to raise and lower the after end of the gaff.  
The standing part could typically be fastened around either the head of the topmast or 
around the neck of the double block at the cap (Kipping 1853:117-118).  Either way, the 
peak halliard would reeve through single blocks on outer and middle portions of the gaff 
before being sent down to the deck.  These single blocks were fastened at a hoop secured 
around the gaff.  From Fincham’s diagram, it appears that the inner hoop is located at 
approximately half the total length of the gaff (including jaws) (Kipping 1853:32).  
Then, the outer hoop was placed halfway between the end of the gaff and the inner hoop.  
This reconstruction is relatively uncertain, given that Kipping’s diagrams were based on 
other sources (such as Fincham 1843).
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Vangs were descending lines that pulled the gaffs downwards, counteracting the 
halliards as well as keeping the yard steady at amidships.  Single vangs, in use at this 
time, were simply rope folded in half and ‘eyed’ at the middle.  This eye was then passed 
around the gaff-end, and one end of the running rope was led to each side of the vessel 
(Kipping 1853:118).
The boom was raised upwards with a topping lift.  A line ran from a hoop 
towards the end of the boom to a single block at the trestle-trees (Kipping 1853:118).  
Based on the diagram of a boom, the hoop was about 1/4 of the length of the boom in 
from the end (Kipping 1853:32).
At this time, boom sheets and guy pendants (to hold the boom in place and 
down) were combined into one.  Although Kipping references only boom sheets for 
schooners, HMS Pioneer’s mizzen boom projects further over the transom than 
contemporary schooners (Kipping 1853:118).  This paired arrangement featured a 
double-block on each side of the hull, at the quarters.  From here, a line reeved on each 
side through a pair of single blocks (one per side) on the boom just aft of the taffrail.
This overview of the process of rigging and outfitting HMS Pioneer, highlights 
the challenges of accommodating steam in sailing vessels.  In this period, steam was still 
seen as secondary to sail, a more reliable method of propulsion.  HMS Pioneer’s rigging 
was reconstructed based on contemporary artistic illustrations, practical instruction 
manuals for sailors, officers, and craftsmen, and on archaeological material.  Combining 
attributes of a topsail schooner and a steamer resulted in a possible reconstruction of 
how this vessel sailed out to search for Franklin in 1850.  However, HMS Pioneer also 
used steam power to a much greater extent than previous Arctic vessels, the subject of 
the Chapter VI.
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CHAPTER VI
RECONSTRUCTION: PROPELLER AND STEAM ENGINE
From the earliest developments of shipboard steam engines, the value of having a 
power source independent of the wind was quickly realized (Cunningham 1861:502).  
With this new capability, the Admiralty knew, lay great advantage in being able to defy 
nature, unlike sails.  However, the large, cumbersome paddlewheels so common on the 
United States’ lake and river systems were not suitable for warships, or for the grinding, 
perilous conditions in the Arctic.  Instead, the British navy focused on the propeller, first 
proposed in 1834, which heralded a new horizon for steamships in the Navy 
(Cunningham 1861:503).
Two major propeller designs vied for supremacy during early development of the 
technology.  The Archimedean screw, based on a design from antiquity consisting of a 
spiraling surface along a horizontal shaft, was first publicized by the steamer Archimedes
in 1839 designed by Francis Petit Smith of Kent, England.  In direct competition to this 
was the Swedish-born John Ericsson’s propeller (Brown 1990:101; Corlett 1993:86-87).  
The two designs were adapted by the British and American navies, with the Admiralty 
pinning its hopes on a version of the Archimedean screw.  
Screw propellers had the advantage of being completely submerged underwater, 
unlike paddle wheels; this afforded greater ship stability by lowering the center of 
gravity and lessened the chances of enemy fire hitting the mechanism on a warship.  
However, before this point, marine steam engines were designed to optimally rotate 
paddle wheels, which had different mechanical requirements than the new screw 
propellers (Hewitt 1998:91).  Accordingly, when studying the advent of screw 
propellers, one must look at developments in marine engine design to understand the 
various adaptive strategies in use, such as the oscillating engine used on Pioneer (Hewitt 
1998:91-92).  
To reconstruct HMS Pioneer’s propeller, the researcher must turn to early screw 
ship trials.  Following the widely-publicized success of the Archimedes trials in 1839, 
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the Admiralty sponsored numerous trial ships to determine (basically by trial-and-error, 
since at this time the physics of screw propulsion were poorly understood) the best 
configurations of engine, hull shape, and screw size (Brown 1990:102-104).  HMS 
Rattler was one such trial ship.  Various experiments on screw shape and size shaped the 
type of propeller carried by vessels in the late 1840s and early 1850s (Brown 1990:111-
114).  The trials tested variations on the Archimedean screw, with the propeller placed in 
an arched-rectangular opening cut between the deadwood and the sternpost.  This 
arrangement was compared to the earlier Ericsson patent calling for the placement of a 
propeller aft of the rudder; later trials showed the flaw in this placement, leading to a 
shift forward of the rudder when Ericsson’s model was adopted by the U.S. Navy 
(Brown 1990:101; Corlett 1993:86-87).   The Rattler trials showed that a longer 
propeller actually reduced efficiency, contrary to popular thought (Brown 1990:111).  
The results of the 1844-1845 trials suggested that the Smith-designed propeller was the 
best; this model was from 8 ft. 2 in. (2.5 m) to 10 ft. in diameter (3.05 m), was 
positioned 10 in. (0.25 m) forward of the center of the aperture, and extended 1 ft. 2 in. 
aft (0.36 m) (Brown 1990:112).    
Based on these criteria and the known propeller aperture for HMS Pioneer, the 
screw propeller was drawn with a diameter of 9.09 feet (2.77 m) behind the deadwood, 
forward of the sternpost (Admiralty 1848:2).  The pitch (or angle of slope for the 
propeller blade) was based upon the angle formed by drawing between the fore upper 
surface and the aft-lower surface, however, it must be noted that this period witnessed 
many experimental propellers.  Still, after 1840, this style based on the Archimedean 
screw was semi-standard; given the risks and skepticism inherent in Arctic travel, it 
seemed reasonable to assume that the Admiralty would opt for a proven design for the 
Arctic voyages (Corlett 1993:101; Osborn 1852b:35).
Part of ensuring that the engine and propeller could keep functioning was to 
make the propeller retractable, and thereby remove it from crushing ice.  This was likely 
similar to the retracting mechanisms used on HMS Erebus and HMS Terror.  In 
addition, the vessels could have been outfitted with an iron brace on the rudder to protect 
32
it and the propeller, like on Fox (Delgado 2009:34).  Throughout the voyage, whenever 
crushing ice threatened the safety of the propeller, it was unshipped, along with the 
rudder (Unknown 1850-1851:3 July).  The crew, once convinced of the value of steam 
propulsion, was constantly concerned about “the safety of the ‘screw’” (Osborn 
1852b:57).  Part of the wintering operations, finished by mid-October, doubtless 
consisted of unshipping the valuable rudder and propeller, to prevent damage during the 
long winter months, although it was not specifically mentioned in these sources (Osborn 
1852b:118; Unknown 1850-1851:17 September).
Steam Engine Development
The earliest ships were propelled by human muscle or wind power harnessed via 
sail.  However, with the scientific queries in the production and expansion of steam in 
the 18th century, as well as the resulting development of steam engines for terrestrial 
uses, this was about to change (Tredgold 1851:First Paper, 5-6). To summarize the 
numerous experiments, it was determined that water, heated over 212°F (its boiling 
point) produced steam, which either expanded in an open container or produced pressure 
in a closed one (Tredgold 1851:First Paper, 14-15).  This force could be used to move a 
reciprocating piston, which was then connected either directly or indirectly (via cranks, 
shafts, and gears) to a paddle to make motion (Tredgold 1851:First Paper, 82). 
Some of the problems these early 19th-century engines faced were generating 
adequate steam with the least amount of fuel, loss of heat in pipes and cylinders, and 
building pressures.    Steam was generated by heating water in a boiler, which could 
require vast amounts of fuel.  The ideal boiler increased the surface area of water being 
heated (making it faster to heat, using less fuel) as well as avoiding pressure loss.  
Accordingly, the early boilers were rectangular, with James Watt’s design having a 
cylindrical top, flat sides, and a concave bottom (Tredgold 1851:First Paper, 126).  In 
order to reduce heat loss, especially in the large cylinders within which the pistons 
moved, jacketing filled with warm water or a vacuum was introduced (Tredgold 
1851:First Paper, 87).  Many of these early engines were dangerous, with uncontrolled 
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rising pressures.  By 1817, British laws required safety valves on boilers (Milton 
1953:4).
In adapting the steam engine to shipboard use, one of the most important 
considerations was space.  In both naval and merchant vessels, space was a valuable 
commodity, whether required for goods, provisions, men, or guns.  Besides shifting the 
focus on design in marine engines to generating the most power in the least amount of 
space (and weight), technological consideration had to address the issue of fuel.  
Through experimentation, it was found that the fuel which produced the most efficient 
heat was coal (Tredgold 1851:First Paper, 106).
The first commercially viable steam-powered vessel in Britain was the Comet of 
Mr. Henry Bell, in 1812 (Sennett 1902:1; Tredgold 1851:Third Paper, 50-51).  It was 
propelled by two paddle-wheels on each side (Thurston 1939:249).  In these very earliest 
steam-vessels, proposed methods of propulsion could be widely varied, with one idea 
being to hang two boards off the back end of the ship and move them up and down like a 
swimmer’s kicking feet (Tredgold 1851:First Paper, 318-319).
The most common arrangement soon became the side-paddlewheel, moved by a 
side-lever engine (Sennett 1902:2-3; Thurston 1939:291).  Over time, however, different 
types of engines were developed, including grasshopper engines, double-cylinder 
engines, and oscillating engines (Sennett 1902:3-4).  Paddlewheels, which required a 
lower rate of rotation for ideal motion through the water, meant that all engines of the 
time were adapted to their mechanical requirements (Hewitt 1998:91).  
Still, paddlewheels were not ideal for many ships.  Variations in the draught of 
the ship, caused by changing cargo or provisions levels, affected the depth and efficiency 
of the wheel (Sennett 1902:4).  Rough conditions, such as those experienced in open 
seas could tilt one paddle out of the water.  In winds or a fast current, the paddle wheels 
could hinder progress by adding drag to an otherwise streamlined vessel form.  In 
addition, the large, cumbersome wheels raised the center of gravity of a vessel 
(especially when combined with the tall walking beam engines favored on American 
inland waterways), causing instability.  Finally, on naval vessels the wheels inhibited the 
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use of broadside guns and were vulnerable to gunfire themselves (Sennett 1902:4).  For 
all these reasons, the Royal Navy preferred Smith’s Archimedean screw designs over 
other options, and trials, as outline earlier, gradually improved the efficiency and speed 
of their design (Brown 1990:102-104; Thurston 1939:294-295).
As previously mentioned, oscillating engines, also known as vibrating engines, 
had been invented earlier, but in the 1840s, they began to be more widely manufactured 
(Anonymous 1840:14-15; Brown 1842:4).  They consisted of a cylinder suspended on 
two hollow trunnions, thereby able to oscillate (tilt) back and forth; the piston rod was 
attached directly to the crank (Main and Brown 1864:155).  In screw-propelled vessels, 
the engine was oriented horizontally, saving space and lowering the center of gravity 
(Sennett 1902:7, 10).  However, screws required a greater speed (rate of rotation) to be 
effective compared to paddlewheels.  Designs shifted from heavy, long-stroked engines 
to short-stroked, high speed, lighter engines (Thurston 1939:299).  This was 
accomplished either by adding multiplying gears or increasing the steam pressure (Main 
and Brown 1864:146; Sennett 1902:6).  Boilers were still box-shaped to reduce the 
amount of space needed on board ship (Milton 1953:5).  Despite complaints about their 
perceived defects (prone to breakdown, difficult to repair), oscillating engines began to 
replace side-lever engines because of their advantages when paired with the screw 
propeller (efficiency in rough conditions, lower space requirements, and greater ship 
stability) (N 1868a; N 1868b; Thurston 1939:300).  This change occurred slowly, 
especially in a merchant service where the advantage of protection from enemy fire was 
irrelevant (Sired 1850:275-277).
Small increases in engine performance were achieved with direct-acting engines 
by decreasing energy losses inherent in more complex engines (Thurston 1939:300).  In 
1854, the passenger steamer Arctic was refit with a “combine steam engine” to increase 
fuel savings by a reported 70% (Anonymous 1854a:220).  This process, produced by 
Wethered’s Steam and Stame Apparatus, involved injecting regular boiler steam with 
superheated “stame” produced by a certain portion of boiler steam being funneled past 
the furnace to “dry” and heat it twice (Anonymous 1854c:45).
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The next big shift was the widespread adoption of surface condensers by about 
1860 (Sennett 1902:10).  The main benefit this achieved was to decrease the formation 
of lime-scale deposits in the boilers (Thurston 1939:300-301).  Previously, it was 
believed that precipitate formation was affected by its concentration in the boiler: this 
new system, allowing for more pressure, showed that deposits were affected by 
temperature, instead (Thurston 1939:301; Tredgold 1851:First Paper, 36).  
With this knowledge, compound engines, with expansion conducted in ever-
larger cylinders, allowed for high-efficiency engines (Sennett 1902:10).  These engines 
are also known as double-expansion engines, and led to changes in pressure from 30 lbs. 
to 90 lbs. per square inch in 1880 (Sennett 1902:12).  Using higher pressures meant less 
fuel was needed to heat the water into steam, saving on fuel economy.  
As pressures increased, boilers changed form to provide more structural support.  
First, cylindrical boilers were introduced (Sennett 1902:10).  With introduction of triple-
expansion or triple compound engines in 1871, pressure tolerances had to increase 
(Milton 1953:5; Sennett 1902:14).  For example, the engine of SS Propontis required 
150 lbs. pressure in 1874 (Sennett 1902:14).  To supply this, an oval-shaped boiler was 
initially used.  This oval design turned out to give trouble in practice, and so the 
cylindrical Scotch boiler replaced it (Milton 1953:5-6).  
Finally, developments in engine design led to the quadruple expansion engine 
(Sennett 1902:14).  These were supplied with steam first by water-tube boilers on naval 
vessels or tank boilers on merchants, with pressures up to 250 lbs. per square inch 
(Milton 1953:9-10).
Steam Engines in the Arctic 
The first voyagers into the Arctic in the 16th century went by sail, and continued 
doing so until John and James Ross.  The Rosses, privately funded by Felix Booth, a gin 
magnate, sailed in the paddle-steamer Victory to search for the Northwest Passage.  After 
overwintering from 1829-1832, they abandoned Victory and returned to England (Durey 
2008:10-11).  However, the use of the engine and paddlewheels proved so problematic 
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that the entire machinery was removed and abandoned within the first year (Ross 
1835:7).  
The building and outfitting of this vessel took place before the adoption in 
Britain of the screw propeller, so the choice of paddlewheels is not surprising, even 
though they would be highly vulnerable to crushing damage from the ice.  In order to 
reduce this damage, Ross contracted with a Mr. Robertson to design paddlewheels which 
could be lifted up and housed inside large paddle boxes above the waterline (Ross
1835:3).  Other adaptations made for the Arctic included the use of a novel boiler design 
by Mr. Ericsson and Mr. Braithwaite, intended to be light and use much less fuel than 
the current design (Braithwaite 1835:1).  Ross’ excitement over proving the efficacy of 
steam for propulsion is evident in his previously-published treatise on the use of steam in 
marine warfare; he was an early adopter of steam technology (Braithwaite 1835:1).
However, this excitement quickly turned to resentment over the failure of the 
engines to work properly in the Arctic conditions (Braithwaite 1835:i).  The first cause 
of the disaster was undoubtably caused by the way the voyage was outfitted: with great 
speed and secrecy.  Sir John Ross did not tell his manufacturers what type of voyage he 
was planning, simply alluding to “war purposes” (Braithwaite 1835:2).  This secrecy 
was insisted upon by Ross’ backer, Sir Booth, probably to forestall any other explorers 
from realizing their plans and beating them in the race to the Passage (Ross 1835:2). In 
addition, this need for speed, and the dependence on sailing in time to the Arctic to avoid 
the seasonal ice, meant that errors in the planning stage did not have time to be 
corrected.  For example, Ross had requested copper boilers (a more elastic and durable 
material than iron), but Braithwaite and Ericsson delivered iron boilers (Ross 1835:2).  
In addition, when the boilers kept leaking during trial runs, Braithwaite and Ericsson 
simply recommended adding malt dust to the water; this was common practice to stop 
new boilers from leaking (Braithwaite 1835:15).
The second problem was the experimental nature of the machinery.  Braithwaite 
and Ericsson probably oversold the practicality of their design in order to have it 
approved by Ross, but the engines, boilers, and paddlewheels were all untested 
37
configurations (Braithwaite 1835:2; Ross 1835:2).  Unlike usual orientations for engines, 
Victory’s was placed horizontally below the waterline, per Ross’ instructions 
(Braithwaite 1835:2-3).  In addition, the engines were operating at high pressure, with 
condensing steam; condensed steam had been used in low-pressure engines, but not in 
high-pressure one (Braithwaite 1835:3).  The machinery was complex, with each gear 
introducing a new failure point.  Finally, the paddlewheels, designed by Mr. Richardson, 
were kept secret from the engine designers, since Richardson had not taken out a patent 
on the design yet (Ross 1835:3).  The novel paddlewheel had boards at a 45° angle to the 
axis of the shaft, rather than parallel boards (Braithwaite 1835:7).  In addition, with the 
heavy weighting of the ship, the wheels’ shaft was less than one foot above the 
waterline, far from the usual placement (Braithwaite 1835:9).
Finally, the design of the Victory’s engine suffered from a lack of experience and 
testing in real conditions.  Although the paddlewheels and engine each worked 
separately, they failed as a combined unit (Braithwaite 1835:6; Ross 1835:3-4).  
Braithwaite blamed the failure on deep paddlewheels and incorrect calculations of the 
power required, while Ross blamed faulty boiler manufacture for not producing enough 
steam (Braithwaite 1835:17-18; Ross 1835:4).  Ross also failed to account for high 
levels of wear on the bellows needed to keep the steam drawing (Braithwaite 1835:3).
From this engineering disaster, however, attentive readers of the time would have 
absorbed two lessons about using steam in the Arctic: first, machinery should be kept 
simple and easy to repair (Braithwaite 1835:5); secondly, bringing along experts in 
repairing and maintaining the engines was essential (Ross 1835:7). 
HMS Erebus and HMS Terror 
Sir John Franklin renewed the use of steam power in the Arctic.  His ships, the 
former bomb vessels HMS Erebus and HMS Terror, were built in 1826 and 1813, 
respectively (Durey 2008:13).  As bomb vessels, they were heavily reinforced for 
strength.  For service in Arctic and Antarctic waters, the vessels were sheathed and 
reinforced at the bow and auxiliary engines were added (Durey 2008:14).  Like the 
Victory before them, Franklin’s ships used sail as their main power source: in fact, they 
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only carried enough fuel to travel 12 days at 3-4 knots, according to calculations by 
Lieutenant John Irving of HMS Terror.  This trend of using steam only as auxiliary 
power would continue until more reliable engines and propellers were developed 
(Greenhill and Allington 1993:146).  
Certain vessels, however, began to widely use steam in this time period: so-
called “steam-aids” or towing vessels (Ross 2002:61).  Originally used in tight harbor 
navigation where sail could be unreliable and dangerous, their use quickly spread to 
longer towing voyages for Arctic-bound vessels (Anonymous 1894:343).  On Franklin’s 
expedition, several steam-powered vessels helped tow the two main ships to the Orkney 
Islands (Ross 2002:61).  These included HMS Rattler (a steam frigate), Monkey, and 
Blazer, thus allowing the expedition to get off to a faster start than would be possible 
under sail.
HMS Erebus and HMS Terror’s low-horsepower engines were taken from 
railroad cars (Durey 2008:14).  They were attached to retractable screw propellers, rather 
than trying utilize paddlewheels as on the Victory.  This was the first use of screw 
propulsion in the Arctic, and the retractable screws, on a mechanism similar to later use, 
would have protected this valuable component (Sennett 1902:320).  To conserve their 
fuel, Admiralty orders instructed Franklin to use the engines only when necessary.  In 
practice, the relatively weak engines would only have been able to break weak new ice, 
not the sort encountered “in circumstances of difficulty” (Durey 2008:14).
When Franklin and his men failed to reappear, many people blamed their 
disappearance on their use of steam-propulsion (Osborn 1852b:34).  Recent scholarship 
has explored this theory, suggesting the presence of engines, theoretically able to drive 
them out of encircling ice, may have led the commander to make more risky decisions 
such as pushing further into the ice with a mistaken assurance that they could work free 
(Durey 2008:14).  However, this seems doubtful in light of Lt. Irving’s calculations of 
their capabilities, and Francis Crozier’s (Franklin’s second-in-command) dour attitude 
towards the usefulness of the engines.  More likely, Franklin and his men were well 
aware of the experimental nature of screw technology, and skeptical of its usefulness.
39
Steam in the Franklin Search Period 
As both official and unofficial backers sent ships, supplies, and men out into the 
Arctic to rescue or find any trace of Franklin and his crew, steam propulsion was 
employed to a limited degree.  Of the 30 ships sent to either search for Franklin, relieve 
previous searchers, or drop supplies, only five were steamers (Ross 2002:65).  
Why was this number so low, in comparison to the great number of large 
commercial steamers built just in 1850 (B 1850:275)?  First, it should be noted that 
many of the widely-used steamers used paddlewheels and the side-lever engine.  
Although this arrangement worked on open-ocean crossings, large vessels with big 
engines were not adapted to narrow ice lanes in the Arctic.  Secondly, unlike these 
purpose-built vessels, ships sent into the Arctic were generally purchased from merchant 
companies like whalers (Anonymous 1881a:245).  Next, speed in getting the search 
finished was important, especially in the early years, when rescue was eagerly expected.  
Using vessels already built, with minimal reinforcing needed, was ideal (Delgado 
2009:25).  Thus, for example, Phoenix, one of the earliest naval screw ships built in 
1832, was sent out in 1853 after being refit (Anonymous 1853:102).  Waiting for steam 
ships to be built was not a viable option.  Finally, the search for Franklin only lasted 12 
years, a fairly short period of time in which to build ships to withstand Arctic pressures.  
It must be remembered that screw propulsion was a risky new idea; on a mission of such 
importance, tried techniques would be preferred.
However, this list of 30 ships sent into the Arctic, while impressive, does not 
include tenders, tugboats, and other “steam-aids” that brought ships partway through the 
journey (Ross 2002:62).  These ships were often critical to the success of the expedition.  
They ensured that convoys reached the Arctic in a timely fashion, before the season 
closed.  In addition, they often carried extra supplies, like provisions or fuel, for the 
ships to top off their stores before sailing into the isolated Arctic.
Even the steam ships used as main parts of Arctic expeditions acted merely as 
“consorts.”  This same language, where the sailing ship is still the primary vessel, is seen 
in Osborn’s account (Osborn 1852b:35).  This was also seen in distributions of men and 
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provisions.  Due to limitations of space and the need for as much fuel as possible, HMS 
Pioneer and HMS Intrepid carried only 12-18 months provisions as compared to three 
years of supplies in the two sailing vessels in their expedition.  Effectively, screw 
steamers could not operate independently of sailing ships.  
HMS Pioneer’s engine was a 60 nhp (nominal horsepower, calculated based on 
the engine’s geometry) two-cylinder, single expansion, oscillating steam engine 
manufactured by James Watt & Co. (Brown 1990:188; Lyon and Winfield 2004:232).  
The oscillating engine, unlike previous engines developed for paddle-wheels, was 
adapted to the different mechanical requirements of screw propulsion (Hewitt 1998:91-
92).  In addition, the oscillating engine, compared to contemporary engines of other 
design, was low-weight, compact (a vital factor both in cargo-carrying merchant ships 
and Artic exploration vessels when coal took up vast amounts of space), durable, and 
reliable (Hewitt 1998:93).  
In 1842, James Brown, of James Watt & Co., took out a patent on a design 
improvement for oscillating engines that increased safety and possible engine size 
(Andrew et al. 2000:29).  Brown’s patent redesigned condensers with separate air 
pumps, so cylinders could operate independently, increasing the reliability of engines 
(Brown 1842:3).  Given the naval records of HMS Pioneer’s engine as well as our 
knowledge of the contemporary technology available, it is probable that the vessel was 
outfitted with an engine similar to the one excavated from the Conside (Hewitt 1998:97).  
This would have fit in the central portion of the hull, by the boiler box and exhaust pipe 
illustrated in the Naval plans (Lyon and Winfield 2004:232).  Based on archaeological 
evidence from the Fox, a steam yacht sent out on McClintock’s 1857 search for 
Franklin, the engine would have rested on a bedplate to support the heavy weight 
amidships (Delgado 2009:25, 32).  However, care must be taken when discussing engine 
design, given the rapid changes in this technology during the latter half of the nineteenth 
century.
As discussed earlier, the late nineteenth century saw the growing use of high 
pressure, compound engines, whereas HMS Pioneer and HMS Intrepid had horizontal 
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oscillating engines.  Boilers in use on Austin’s expedition did not need to generate such 
high pressures, and were thus likely the box-form discussed in Milton (1953:5).  As seen 
on Fox and in contemporary illustrations of the vessel, the boiler funnel of HMS Pioneer
was located between the fore and main mast (see Figure 1) (Delgado 2009:30; Osborn 
1852a).
It is clear from Osborn’s account (biased though it may be), that this new 
generation of steam-ships had more than the simple auxiliary-steam propulsion of HMS 
Erebus and HMS Terror.  With Pioneer’s engine and coal supplies, it could steam for 
5000 miles alone (8046.7 km), or tow its sailing cousin 3000 miles (4828 km) (Osborn 
1852b:35).  Both ships were outfitted with marine engines, not adapted railway models 
(Osborn 1852b:33).  In accounts of working through the ice, in addition to using old 
techniques of pulling the ship along by hand, Osborn also details strategies for ramming 
into leads in the ice (Osborn 1852b:69).  Although the ship could not charge through 
solid 6 inch (15.24 cm) thick ice, it was able to move easily through 9 inch (22.86 cm) 
broken ice (Osborn 1852b:42, 63).  The screw-steamer did prove valuable in Arctic 
exploration (Osborn 1852b:41).  
During the Franklin search, public interest in Arctic exploration peaked, and 
newspaper articles, personal accounts, and traveling exhibits were in high demand 
(David 2000:240-241).  Part of this interest focused on the technology in use, with news 
articles remarking on the ships (Anonymous 1850:146).  For example, an account of the 
start of Dr. Elisha Kent Kane’s 1855 expedition notes the Release, a sailing ship, and the 
Arctic, using a screw propeller (Anonymous 1855a:108).  
However, popular opinion on the use of steam propulsion, in the early years of 
the search, used phrases like “shipwreck” and “disaster” in their predictions (Osborn 
1852b:17).  Early steam navigation was littered with catastrophes, and with greater use 
of steam vessels came more accidents (Anonymous 1854b:405; Anonymous 1855b:86).  
These early accidents sometimes resulted from speeding along in dangerous conditions, 
though that would not be a main concern in the Arctic (Anonymous 1854b:406).  At 
other times, the danger was in running out of fuel with no chance of resupply (Kjaer and 
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Foxworthy 2004:37).  In the isolated north, the main concern was the single screw 
breaking, which could leave a vessel helpless (Anonymous 1894:343).  This is another 
reason why steam was never the only form of ship propulsion in the Franklin search: 
sailing rigs, however rudimentary, acted as a safety net.
The End of an Era
As the Franklin search ended with the discovery of conclusive evidence for the 
loss of both ships and all their men on King William Island in 1859, the face of Arctic 
discovery began to change (Ross 2002:58-59).  Exploration expeditions gradually shifted 
to steamships as their main vessels, with sailing ships as consorts (Capelotti 2008:263).  
In the words of a contemporary commentator, steam was “no longer the harassed 
handmaiden” of sailing ships (Anonymous 1894:343).  The rise of the screw steamer 
also showed the hazards of relying on a single screw on a ship with increasingly 
rudimentary sails (Anonymous 1894:343-344).  By 1894, the double-screw ship was 
becoming standard on the seas; the higher initial cost paid in dangerous areas like the 
high northern seas, where towing costs or drifting helpless were not desirable outcomes, 
were outweighed by the dangers and potential for loss.
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CHAPTER VII
HEAT AND COAL
Reliable and efficient heating systems were vitally important on HMS Pioneer’s 
expeditions.  This was a shift in focus from earlier voyages, where no such provisions 
were made.  There was likely a two-fold reasoning for this: search expeditions were 
increasingly being asked to overwinter at least one Arctic winter, unlike contemporary 
whalers, which left at the end of the season, and thus did not need heating systems.  
Secondly, there was an increased focus in the nineteenth century on sailors’ health and 
well-being, as evidences by treatises on lime-juice and concerns over “bad air”
(Armstrong 1857:614; Editor 1850:400).  
Hence, there were heated arguments published in contemporary trade magazines 
debating the merits and drawbacks of various heating systems (Eugenius 1827:219-220;
Warm 1827:395-396).  A key component to these arguments was the question of “bad 
air,” that is, whether heating air to the high degree required in these systems rendered it 
unfit for human use.  Besides the effects from heating up air, the early Victorians were 
growing concerned about ventilation, or getting fresh air into heated rooms. This 
question was vitally important on ships as well, since humidity was readily blamed for ill 
health among the crew (Winton 1977:90-91).
The solution on HMS Pioneer was the Sylvester Heating Apparatus, installed in 
the hull during its refit for Arctic service (Editor 1850:400).  A description of the likely 
design of the Apparatus can be extrapolated from the full account by S. Egan Rosser, in 
1850, of the heating arrangement on board HMS Investigator (Armstrong 1857:609-
614).  
On HMS Investigator, the stove (called a cockle in contemporary terms, 
dimensions about 3 feet [1 m] square) was located in the hold, situated on a planked and 
copper-laid platform above the “kelson” (keelson).  This arrangement formed a small 
hollow chamber, into which air flowed from outside via an iron pipe fitted with a cowl 
or wind sail on the main deck.  From the hollow chamber, the air entered into the lower 
44
portion of the cockle via small holes in the planked platform.  Inside the stove, a lower 
fire-box was surmounted by a tube chamber above, with the whole enclosed by a sheet-
iron jacket: air passed between these layers to be heated twice (Armstrong 1857:609-
611).  The fire box was likely fitted with rollers, as described in John Sylvester’s 1845 
patent, as an improvement in maintaining the fire over his 1832 patent (Sylvester 
1832:2; Sylvester 1845:2).   Shutters were used to vary the flow of air into the firebox, 
thus allowing some temperature control (Sylvester 1845:3).  
From the cockle, warm air ascended through a set of branching “caliducts”
forward and aft  in the ship: one end passed through the officer’s staterooms into the 
after-cabin, the other extended forward into the crew’s foc’s’le (Armstrong 1857:612).  
Meanwhile, smoke from the stove was brought up to the upper or spar deck via a vertical 
smoke flue, where it branched into a double-plated horizontal oval smoke-tube, which 
extended from the main to the fore hatchway, giving off more heat, and serving as a 
useful place for the crew to dry damp laundry (Armstrong 1857:613).  These smoke-
flues were removable, a vital feature in ships, where space was precious (Armstrong 
1857:614).  Once at the fore hatchway, the smoke from the Sylvester’s Apparatus and 
from the galley fires was directed out of the ship via a ventilating chimney or funnel, 
which faced away from prevailing winds and was covered with a cowl to prevent 
backdraft; this same cowl method was used on the air intake pipe into the stove to 
prevent a dangerous fire flare-up (Armstrong 1857:609, 613).  
Crew descriptions of the heat given off by the Sylvester’s Apparatus ranged from 
endearing gratitude (“nor let…Sylvester fall”) to complaining about the time and effort 
required to keep it properly lit and ventilated (Osborne and McDougall 1852:38, 57).  
Officers and crews seemed to have different ideas about hygiene and heat, with officers 
keen on ventilating the ship regularly, and the crew complaining about the cold air that 
the process let into the ship.  One other note must be taken based on these accounts: 
although the Sylvester was designed to use coal, it appears that any fuel source, 
including sticks or lignum vitae, were used to heat the small stove (Armstrong 1857:614;
Osborne and McDougall 1852:12).  
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Although it appears that the Sylvester’s Warming Apparatus could be fueled with 
whatever materials available, the engines and galley stoves (and other equipment, when 
alternative fuels were scarce) were all powered by coal.  HMS Pioneer carried 300 tons 
of coal, which was stored in the central part of the hold.  Conserving the supply of coal 
seems to have been a constant concern, as Austin’s squadron was constantly being 
resupplied by its consorts until they were forced to leave by encroaching ice (Unknown 
1850-1851:30 May, 18 June, 21 June).
Even with assistance from accompanying transport ships, this stockpile of coal, 
along with the 12 to 18 months of provisions carried on board, reduced the crew to 30 
people, including officers.  This was only half of the number of men carried on the sail-
powered ships, even though Pioneer and Intrepid were 50 feet (15.2 m) longer (Osborn 
1852b:34-35, 47).  Thus, as discussed above when configuring the rigging, even though 
this was a naval vessel, adaptations were most likely made to reduce the number of men 
needed for basic sailing maneuvers.  In addition, watches not on immediate duty on 
board the sailing ships HMS Resolute and HMS Assistance were frequently sent over to 
aid the men of HMS Pioneer or HMS Intrepid in large-scale operations such as coaling, 
unshipping rudders, or working through the ice (Unknown 1850-1851:23 June, 3 July, 2 
August).  Thus, it can be seen that the new technologies being used, as well as the harsh 
Arctic conditions, affected daily life and traditional schedules on board.  These effects 
on daily life will be discussed next.
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CHAPTER VIII
DAILY LIFE
The Start of the Season
In the 1850 season, as Capt. Austin’s expedition began, his vessels constantly 
encountered other search parties with the same objective: find Franklin or evidence 
showing what happened to him and his men.  Captain Penny’s expedition features most 
prominently in Osborn’s account, since the two groups wintered nearby and searched 
areas together.  Captain Penny was in command of two sailing vessels, the Lady 
Franklin and the Sophia (Osborn 1852b:63).  In addition, Sir John Ross searched for his 
missing colleague with the Felix, and was joined by Captain Forsyth in the Prince
Albert, a ship bought by Lady Franklin for the search (Osborn 1852b:67).  Another 
privately-funded group that Osborn encountered was the Grinnell expedition, funded by 
philanthropist John Grinnell for the  American Navy, and captained by Lieutenant de 
Haven, with the Advance and Rescue (Osborn 1852b:107-108).  Whalers and other 
search groups were reported by Osborn, but played a minor role in his narrative.  In all, 
Osborn estimated 500 American and British sailors and officers were involved in the 
Franklin search in the spring of 1851 (Osborn 1852b:147).
Between these groups, Osborn reported a friendly rivalry, with ships racing each 
other through channels and bays to be the first to find evidence of Franklin and win both 
the prize money and fame (Osborn 1852b:43, 108).  At the same time there was an 
intense comradeship between these people all at the mercy of the elements: ships would 
warn each other of danger, lend equipment, and give provisions to their fellows (Osborn 
1852b:41-42. 86, 106).
A Hurried Outfit and Departure  
Captain Austin’s expedition force was composed of four vessels: two sailing 
ships and two screw-propelled steamers (Osborn 1852b:16).  The two sailing vessels 
were HMS Resolute and HMS Assistance; both were bluff-bowed boats rigged as barks, 
which meant they featured three masts, with the fore and mainmast carrying square sails, 
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and the mizzenmast rigged with a fore and aft sail (Osborn 1852b:32).   This rig 
balanced the ability to attain high speeds from the square sails with the weatherliness 
and maneuverability of a fore and aft rig provided by the mizzenmast sails. 
These barks’ hulls were “strengthened according to the most orthodox arctic 
rules,” which resulted in a very wide, box-like hull, designed to push the ice ahead 
without damaging the vessel (Osborn 1852b:32-33).  This strengthening was 
accomplished by adding layers of tough planking to the hull, forming a double-planked 
hull, a common practice of the time.
The second half of the expedition consisted of two screw-propeller steamers, 
HMS Intrepid and HMS Pioneer.  They were sister ships, and as noted, were formerly 
used for cattle-transportation (Osborn 1852b:33).  The vessels were both rigged as three-
masted schooners, as well as having two 30-horsepower engines in each of their holds 
(Osborn 1852b:32-33).  Schooners are defined by their exclusively fore and aft rig, 
making them superb at sailing into the wind, but with the disadvantage of less speed 
before the wind compared to the square sail.  However, in an Arctic environment, with 
highly changeable weather and constantly shifting ice floes, the ability to move forward 
against contrary winds or to avoid the looming iceberg were valuable attributes (Osborn 
1852b:52).  
Osborn lauded the screw-propeller system housed in his ship as “the first ever 
tried in the Polar regions,” even though Franklin’s expedition was also fitted with screw-
propellers, although how much they were used remains a mystery (Brief Critical 
Reviews 1989:322; Osborn 1852b:7).  Osborn was very interested in promoting 
mechanical propulsion over sail power, so estimations of speed power produced by the 
engines may be exaggerated for effect.  Still, the usefulness of ready power in contrary 
or nonexistent winds cannot be denied. 
Unfortunately, Osborn considered the operation and maintenance of the screw-
propeller engines of “technical interest” only (Osborn 1852b:195), although the reader 
can determine the capabilities of the engines (see Table 8).  For the nautical 
archaeologist, this accounting of speed attained by the engine, along with the size of the 
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engine and date outfitted, can help determine the likely style of engine used.  In addition, 
analysis of the engine shows the increasing importance of steam, as can be seen in the 
increases in power capacity between the Franklin (20 horsepower engines) and Austin 
(30 horsepower engines) expeditions in just five years (Osborn 1852b:32; Osborn 
1865:286).  
HMS Pioneer was frequently compelled to tow the Resolute due to nonexistent 
or contrary winds or bad ice conditions, and Osborne described  their sailing 
counterparts as “helpless babes” or “huge incubi” dragging the pace of the search down 
(Osborn 1852b:205).  Speed was crucial when fickle winds and weather could change a 
passable strait into an ice-choked hazard in a few short hours (Osborn 1852b:56).  Still, 
the greatest advantage of these steam engines was not speed, but maneuverability in low 
or no wind, something impossible without the exhausting heaving and wearing 
maneuvers which will be discussed later.  It is also important to note that the term 
“screw” is used to refer to the propeller and engine itself, as well as to reference the 
entire ship, such as in “[the Intrepid] was pushed up the iceberg high and dry; and…the 
bonnie screw came down again right and tight” (Osborn 1852b:193).  As in the above 
example, accurate knowledge of terms is important for the archaeologist, as when 
comparing damage seen on a vessel to historical accounts.
The much greater speeds attained by HMS Pioneer and HMS Intrepid were also 
due to their hull design. The sharp bow of the original design on these transport ships 
allowed the hull to slip between ice floes and wedge open a path through the ice; hull 
improvements during the refit process reduced the damage taken doing this manuever 
(Osborn 1852b:34).  The hull was strengthened by having a layer of doubling planking 
fastened over the original frames; each deck of the vessel was also doubled (Osborn 
1852b:33-34).  As Osborn noted, having two sets of holes fastening the hull together 
severely weakened the frames; he identified most of the ship’s strength as coming from 
the doubled hull and decks instead, termed “bread-and-butter” construction (Osborn 
1852b:34).  The fine bow shape was maintained by shifting the doubling location from 
the outer surface of the hull to the inner, so although Pioneer appeared wider after her 
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refit, the bow had the same dimensions as before.  The presence of doubled sets of 
fastening holes on a wreck could indicate to the archaeologist a vessel modified for ice 
conditions, rather than one built specifically for polar conditions.
On the screw-steamers, the screw, rudder, and sternpost were designed so that 
even if they were ripped off by the ice, the vessel would still be able to “swim” (Osborn 
1852b:34).  Whether these design modifications would allow the steamer to move in this 
damaged state is unclear.  HMS Intrepid’s rudder and screw-framing were damaged in 
pack ice, but was apparently able to return to England without any towing necessary 
(Osborn 1852b:194).  After that event, it did appear to need more help in navigating and 
clearing through the ice pack, almost causing HMS Pioneer’s crew to spend another 
winter in the Arctic (Osborn 1852b:204-206).  However, the ship was able to travel back 
to England in its damaged condition.
All of the vessels involved in the expedition had similar internal modifications 
for wintering on the ice (Osborn 1852b:34).  Each ship and steamer had a hot-air 
distribution system running through the lower decks and cabin (Osborn 1852b:33).  To 
further insulate from the frigid environment, all doors and bulkheads were doubled.  
Cooking was accomplished on board in a “cooking battery,” with food served either in 
the crew’s mess or officer and captain’s gunroom.  Crews slept forward, while aft the 
rows of officer’s cabins on either side completed the description of the internal layout 
(Osborn 1852b:34).
The expedition’s sailing ships were manned by 60 men, one-quarter of them 
officers; Osborn remarks upon this as a large proportion, compared to usual sailing ships 
(Osborn 1852b:33).  By contrast, the steamers carried 30 men, including five officers 
(Osborn 1852b:35).  In the steamers, two of the officers were engineers, whose sole 
responsibility was to keep the screw propellers in working order (Osborn 1852b:35).  
Indeed, the importance of the propellers was apparent to everyone in the squadron after 
only 11 days in the ice (Osborn 1852b:57).  
Descriptions of the boats brought on the expedition are frustratingly vague.  Most 
of these small craft are described simply as “boats,” used to recover gear, tow the ships, 
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explore and land on land, check for moving ice, and innumerable other tasks (Osborn 
1852b:24, 54, 74, 98).  In addition, in an environment where shifting ice could sink a 
ship with barely any warning, boats were outfitted for emergencies, to allow the crew to 
survive and carry out their mission (Osborn 1852b:58).  These boats were propelled 
either by oars or a simple sail (Osborn 1852b:189).  
The only named boats were launches and gigs. The launch belonged to Sir John 
Ross, and referred to the boat sent to take supplies off  Pioneer after it grounded hard on 
a limestone outcrop (Osborn 1852b:86).  The only mention of a gig is to one used by 
Captain Penny, in what Osborn interprets as an official visit, indicating that a gig was a 
boat or term used for formal occasions (Osborn 1852b:82).  For the nautical 
archaeologist, accounts from this era referring to launches and gigs might also refer to 
specialized supply-carrying or official boat uses, which also indicate a general size.  For 
example, a “gig”, which would only need to carry the captain or a small group for 
official visits, was likely smaller than the “launch,” which had enough space on board to 
take a significant amount of cargo out of HMS Pioneer.
In addition, there were specifically mentioned boats, such as the “India-rubber 
boat, constructed upon a plan of my dear friend Peter Halkett” (Osborn 1852b:67).  This 
was an inflatable vessel, apparently relatively slow, that Osborn used to go out on 
shooting expeditions.  Amazingly, Osborn did not sink this vessel, although its use is not 
mentioned again. 
Another set of specific boats were the craft specifically built for search 
expeditions in the spring, before the ships were clear of ice (Osborn 1852b:172).  These 
were probably more seaworthy than their counterparts used for odd-jobs around the ship.  
Again, no other mention of these boats is made, and the account of spring expeditions 
does not include any boat excursions.  
Boats could be equipped with boat stoves, which were also used in sledge 
excursions (Osborn 1852b:114).  This stove was 18 inches by nine inches (45.7 cm by 
22.9 cm), and was fueled with lignum vitae.  Given that they were used in both boat and 
sledge expeditions, the stove was likely not fixed in place, and was probably not stored 
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with the boats on deck. Thus, indeterminate remains, either interpretable as a sledge or a 
boat, should not be identified based on the presence of a “boat” stove. 
The final mode of transportation carried in the North was the sledge, used to haul 
equipment with a group on an overland expedition.  The sledges consisted of two iron-
shod runners, held together with a system of cross-braces or battens (Osborn 
1852b:151).  On each corner of the rectangular sledge, an upright iron stanchion fit into 
a socket.  This frame could then be fit with a gutta-percha or oiled-canvas fabric, which 
would form a temporary boat in an emergency (Osborn 1852b:151).  Based on the 
observations made on sledge-tracks found at the Franklin expedition’s winter quarters, 
the sledge runners were placed approximately two feet (0.61 m) apart (Osborn
1852b:95).  Although the wood material was tough and seasoned, the lashings and metal 
and wooden fittings on the sledges deteriorated relatively quickly, after only autumn and 
spring runs (Osborn 1852b:151, 170).  In a marine environment, the only pieces left for 
the nautical archaeologist would likely be the runners and iron stanchions, though 
corrosion would play a factor in preservation.
Each sledge consisted of 440 pounds (181 kg) of “deadweight” (including the 
weight of sledge and standard supplies, like a boat cooking stove, blanket-bags, and 
spare clothes and boots) (Osborn 1852b:151-152).  To this was added the weight of food 
and essential belongings for each man (about 172 pounds [78 kg] per man, with 6-7 men 
on a sledge), for a total fully-loaded sledge weight of 1408 pounds (638 kg) (Osborn 
1852b:153).  This worked out to 201 pounds (91 kg) per man, which was considered the 
maximum load any man was capable of dragging.
Although Penny’s expedition had dogs to pull the heavy sledges, Austin’s 
squadron relied on manpower to pull a sledge, despite one man’s suggestion of taming a 
wild bear to pull his sledge for him (Osborn 1852b:46, 148).  This involved attaching 
everyone to drag ropes, and simply pulling until the destination was reached (Osborn 
1852b:112).  If the breeze was favorable, a sail or a kite could be raised in help pull the 
sledge (Osborn 1852b:161).
52
Other supplies stowed on the expedition ships included food (usually dense, high 
in energy, and non-perishable), equipment for shipboard tasks (such as boathooks, 
anchors, and lots of line), guns and ammunition (to catch birds, bears, and other wildlife 
in order to supplement provisions and stave off scurvy), communication equipment 
(including rockets, kites, balloons, fire-balloons, pigeons, and Arctic fox collars), and 
clothing, such as the seal-skin trousers given to an embarrassed Osborn by his Danish 
host (Osborn 1852b:31, 45, 47, 134-138, 153).  Finally, both steamers had to carry vast 
quantities of coal to run their engines.  Initially, each vessel carried 260 tons, but when 
their supply-ship left them in Greenland, each ship was packed tight with 300 tons of 
coal (Osborn 1852b:34-35).  Osborn comments on the “coal-dust every where and on 
every thing” (Osborn 1852b:24).  All of the ships were packed with as many provisions 
and supplies as possible, so much so that, when the departing Americans offered them 
more supplies, Osborn declined on the grounds that there was no more room (Osborn 
1852b:106).
Of the provisions carried, the most notable for the nautical archaeologist is the 
“ice-anchor,” illustrated and described by Osborn (1852b:39-40).  The ice anchor was a 
relatively small hook, able to be lifted by one man in a boat.  The anchor was deployed 
by the man cutting a hole in a convenient and stable iceberg, and setting the anchor in 
place (Osborn 1852b:40).  In the island-choked regions of the Canadian Arctic, icebergs 
often ran aground, and thus were the closest, most stable surface for anchoring (Osborn 
1852b:39). A standard anchor would easily be lost in the grinding, scraping pack ice, as 
well as presenting a hazard on the bow of the ship.  Ice floes could move ships suddenly 
and violently, and a static cable could tear a ship apart.  The comparatively flimsy ice 
anchor would fail or become detached first, allowing the ship to escape unscathed.
Into the Ice
Although Osborn mostly just referenced common sailing maneuvers by name, 
without elaborating on the process, he did detail ice maneuvers, designed to orient and 
steer the ship in the constantly-shifting ice pack.
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“Tracking,” “hauling,” or heaving a ship was used when no favorable breeze was 
present (Osborn 1852b:54).  Generally, it involved pulling the ship through the water or 
ice using manual force.  If the ship was near a stable ice floe, men would pull on lines 
attached to the ship, in an arrangement similar to moving canal-boats in England, 
although without the horses.  Thirty-five to 40 men would put strap on “track belts,”
which were attached to whale lines (ropes) connecting to the ship (Osborn 1852b:54).  
Another option was to kedge by setting their “ice-anchors,” running their lines through 
the hawse holes, and pulling the ship along with the capstan.  Men would be dispatched 
to move the anchors as needed (Osborn 1852b:195).  Finally, if no convenient floe was 
nearby, boats could tow the ship (Osborn 1852b:54).  
Steamships could move without the aid of wind, and so their crews were spared 
much of this labor.  The engines allowed propulsion control so fine that steamships 
could keep place in a current by moving in figure eight motions (Osborn 1852b:101).  If 
the captain did not have enough space to turn the vessel, “making a cannon” essentially 
involved driving the ship at the opposite side of the channel on an angle (Osborn 
1852b:55-56).  This motion, like in miniature golf, would force the ship to turn quickly.
Finally, to break through ice, the steamships relied on quick blows with the bow, 
aided by their screw propellers (Osborn 1852b:195).  The ship would lunge forward 
under steam, striking the ice at a weak point or in an opening lead in the pack.  Then, the 
ship would be hauled back by men on the side, the loose ice cleared away, and the 
process repeated.  In the Austin expedition, with two steamships, the ships switched 
back and forth to allow time for ice to be cleared away from the precious propeller 
(Osborn 1852b:195).
Winter is Coming
In order to prepare for the harsh winter, the ship had to be battened down tightly 
to prevent heat loss, while still allowing daily activities to take place.  Osborn’s narrative 
does not record the start of winter adaptations to the ship, possibly due to a brief warm
spell mentioned for the week of 14 September (Osborn 1852b:109).  At any rate, by 2 
October, preparations for wintering were well underway (Osborn 1852b:110).  Due to 
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the reference during this period to fights in the messes over smoke and heat levels, 
wintering started in late September (Osborn 1852b:110).  The wintering process ended 
with Captain Penny’s return to his own ship; it lasted until some point after 17 October, 
and before 8 November (Osborn 1852b:117-119).  Therefore, wintering a vessel took 
roughly one month.
In wintering, all excess lumber and other provisions were removed from the 
upper deck and the boats were taken off and attached to the ice around the ship in case of 
emergency (Osborn 1852b:118).  A sturdy felt, set 15 feet (4.6 m) above the upper deck 
formed an enclosed exercise space, with holes cut for smoke and air ventilation (Osborn 
1852b:118, 130).  The housing had to be sturdy enough to withstand the up to 400 tons 
of snow deposited in a single storm (Osborn 1852b:130-131).  This was accomplished 
by bracing the inside with spars and spare timbers.  The heating pipes and stove were 
started, and toilets were cut so the men did not get sick (Osborn 1852b:118).  
One of the real concerns of Arctic travel was the long winter, in which the sun 
left the world on November 8 and did not return until February 7 (Osborn 1852b:119, 
140).  Osborn’s strategy for keeping morale up involved daily routine, as well as 
boredom-averting activities.  These activities included: a theatre, casino, saloon, two 
newspapers (one illustrated), evening classes, and lectures (Osborn 1852b:121).  For the 
nautical archaeologist, this would produce artifacts that do not seem connected with the 
ordinary routine on a working ship.
Social Conditions 
Finally, archaeological and historical reconstructions of ships must always 
include consideration of the lives of those who lived onboard.  This will include an 
analysis of the supplies and provisions carried on board; luckily, official and personal 
accounts of these voyages provide much detail (Belcher 1855; Eyre and H.M.S.O. 1852; 
M'Dougall 1857a; Osborn 1852b; Osborne and McDougall 1852).  A spatial analysis of 
the living and working areas will be considered, including considerations of social status 
and rank on board.  
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The Silent Background of Daily Life
The Illustrated Arctic News articles cover short fictional stories, accounts of 
search or sledge excursions, and descriptions of notable events like balls, plays, or 
pantomimes.  Rarely, however, is daily life mentioned in the newspaper.  A simple 
explanation may be found in the purpose of the IAN: “to relieve the monotony of sunless 
days-to show to all, that fun & good fellowship” could be found in the harsh Arctic 
winter (Osborne and McDougall 1852:1).  The stories focused on special events, but 
glimpses of work routines, daily rations, and other sundry events can be seen in them.
In addition, information can be gleaned from McDougall’s images, which offer a 
contemporary look at scenes of Arctic life.  This is in direct opposition to previous 
British depictions of the Arctic, which relied on stock “scenes” that were usually 
stereotypical (David 2000:82-84).  Some of these “stock scenes” were repeated in the 
IAN: thus one sees the images of “Esquimaux canoes,” desolate scenery, and nature’s 
danger, which were also common in British depictions of the Arctic for the public  
(Osborne and McDougall 1852:2, 7, 35).  However, many more of the images feature 
daily occurrences in a sailor’s life, including writing by candlelight with a glass of 
something nice at hand, being woken up for midnight watch, and hauling ice for fresh 
water (Osborne and McDougall 1852:1, 5. 33).  In addition, scenes show common tools 
and clothing choices by sailors (Osborne and McDougall 1852:8, 19, 21, 33, 54).
Other aspects of daily life are not as visible in the historical record, although 
Admiralty records and plans drafted by the commanders of Arctic expeditions give 
detailed accounts of supplies and provisions.  Instead, this analysis will concentrate on 
themes reflected in the IAN and their impact on Arctic seafaring life, starting with 
boredom and touching on issues of language, status, authority, fear, conflict, race, 
gender, nostalgia, and community.  Sources of information primarily spring from the 
pages of the IAN itself, although insights will be compared to contemporary accounts of 
the voyage and wider British culture as well.
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Boredom
Boredom was a constant presence in overwintering in the Arctic: landscapes 
were harsh and monotonous.  The disappearance of the sun for three months out of the 
year, and frequent inclement weather increased this pressure: travel and other forms of 
activity were inhibited (Osborne and McDougall 1852:55).  Days were circumscribed by 
routine maintenance of the ships, which varied little.  Events like the plays put on in the 
Royal Arctic Theatre, fancy dress balls, Evenings at Home, and other entertainment 
mentioned served to relieve the boredom.  Officers and crew alike were encouraged to 
participate in all these events, as well as running the newspapers and schoolroom 
(Osborn 1852b:121).  
Nevertheless, by the end of the winter, even these amusements were growing 
stale.  Advertisements for the plays in the IAN take a new tone, emphasizing the 
“newness” of the scripts, actors, and scenery (Osborne and McDougall 1852:53).  
Novelty was the order of the day to stave off boredom.
Language and Slang
Sailors’ language has traditionally been a category of speech and writing all to 
itself, with references to various workings of the ship and the seaman’s life peppered 
throughout.  For this publication, care seems to have been taken to ensure the reading 
public could understand some of the more obscure sailor’s slang, with notes added to 
explain various terms, such as the “seven-beller” (Osborne and McDougall 1852:38).  In 
addition, the owner of this copy of the facsimile (Admiral Sir Richard Vesey Hamilton) 
scrawled handwritten notes in pencil in the margins (Osborne and McDougall 
1852:frontispiece).  As this was a personal copy, he held nothing back in his own 
language, adding obscenities when particularly moved (Osborne and McDougall 
1852:17).  As mentioned earlier, the censorship process at sea and in Britain meant foul 
language (likely originally present) was excised from the manuscript.  However, 
instances of slang still abound, showing the priorities of the sailors.
First, many slang terms seen in the IAN referred to alcohols of varying types and 
qualities.  “Old Tom” was served, along with rum, at the Grand Bal Masqué on HMS 
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Resolute in December (Osborne and McDougall 1852:23).  “Old Tom” referred to a 
sweet, old-fashioned style of gin popular at the time.  Other alcohol served was the “blue 
ruin” of gin and “the intoxicating draught called eight-penny” (Osborne and McDougall 
1852:26).  Clearly, alcohol was an important aspect of seafaring life reflected in the 
language.
While terms like these likely proliferated in sailing society, other slang terms 
seen in the IAN appear to be specific to polar travel and the voyage.  For example, “Old 
Zero” or “Emperor Zero” appears frequently as a trickster and adversary figure to be 
respected and avoided in the Arctic (Osborne and McDougall 1852:12, 21, 31, 42, 53).  
In his words and actions, Zero was eager to get into the ship and cause havoc to the men.  
He is depicted ruling over his icy domain in long white robe, golden crown, flowing 
white beard and hair, standing next to a large thermometer (Osborne and McDougall 
1852:55).  “Zero” serves as a counterpart to “Old Father Neptune” of the open sea: 
representing the forces of nature which must be respected by the ship and its crew.  By 
the end of the winter, his character was personified and mocked by the crew in a 
pantomime performance, which was so popular among the squadron that it featured a 
repeat performance (Osborne and McDougall 1852:31, 53).
Slang terms were also used to indicate social status, such as the “seven-bellers;”
men who were engaged but unmarried (Osborne and McDougall 1852:19, 38-39).  They 
were depicted as socially distinct from their unmarried colleagues, bonded together by 
longing and sweet words for their loves back home.  Engagement represents a period of 
liminality between the unmarried and married state, and this contributed to the formation 
of a special term for these men who unable to engage fully with either bachelors or 
married men.  
The term “seven-bellers” itself indicates some of the anxiety inherent in their 
condition: based on the bell system (bells rung every half-hour, from one to eight times, 
in order to mark changes in the watch), the call of seven bells was situated directly 
before eight bells, at 3:30, 7:30, or 11:30 AM or PM.  Traditional watch schedules in the 
Royal Navy placed seven bells right before the changing of the watch (Volo and Volo 
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2002:98-99).  Any man standing his watch at seven bells would be anxious to get off 
duty, eagerly awaiting eight bells, just as these men eagerly awaited the return voyage so 
they could marry.  The “seven-bellers” were also seen as indecisive because they were 
not able to commit and marry before a long, hazardous voyage: they “want-Oh! they 
don’t know what!” (Osborne and McDougall 1852:19).
Finally, language denoted class status.  Although the newspapers were all edited 
by officers, both crew and officers could contribute articles, lending a variety of voices 
and tones to the content.  One such variation is the “wentilation” letter, responding to a 
call in the previous number to submit articles about the best way to ventilate the ships 
(Osborne and McDougall 1852:57).  This ventilation process utilized the Sylvester 
warming apparatus, as discussed in Chapter VII of this thesis.  This letter suggested that 
results from the Sylvester varied, and opinions about the best way to ventilate were a 
common source of friction between men.  “Joe Muggins,” the author, writes using 
deliberate misspellings and speech patterns to support his claim to be a common 
crewmember.  “Joe” complains about the officers constantly opening the valves to let 
cold air and “that black-guard Mr. Zero” into the officers’ mess.  Figuring out the 
identity of the actual author is impossible given the use of pseudonyms, but I think it 
likely that the piece was penned by a junior officer or midshipman, with no authority 
within the gunroom to change his situation, but needing an outlet to vent frustrations.  
This conclusion is drawn from “Joe’s” knowledge of the gunroom situation, as well as 
the heavy use of lower-deck slang and speech patterns: no other article in the IAN uses 
this form of language, thus it was likely employed on purpose as a disguise.
Status: Officers, Marines, and Crew
Beyond language, status differences between the officers, marines, and crew 
were maintained on board through segregation of the classes while preparing for events, 
in food options, and in socializing.  While all these examples pertain to special occasions 
(fancy dinners, plays, and the like), the social separation reflected here likely occurred 
during daily tasks and chores as well.  
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Actors for theatrical productions were divided into the crew (who primarily 
produced farces and pantomimes) and officers (producing more serious plays as the 
winter progressed) (Osborne and McDougall 1852:10, 31, 53).  This division likely 
continued backstage, with costumes, props, and backdrops produced separately as well.
Divisions by class were also seen in the large dinners (most notably, around 
Christmas): officers were invited to the gunroom table and treated with gin and 
gingerbread brought special from Britain, or to the Resolute captain’s table for a 22-dish 
dinner and toasts (Osborne and McDougall 1852:29-30).  Crewmembers ate in their 
messes, which were gaily decorated, on “Fresh Beef, Plum-puddings, Cakes, &c, &c.”
(Osborne and McDougall 1852:30).  At Christmas, the marines and sailors “fraternized 
on this occasion,” indicating that normally they formed separate social and occupational 
groups.
Finally, class divisions were determined by schedule: officers ate Christmas 
dinner later than the crew, at 3:30PM, continuing on into the night with toasts and music 
provided by the crew band (Osborne and McDougall 1852:30).  This division in 
schedule was also seen at the Grand Ball: crewmembers were expected to vacate after 
10:30 PM, but officers from the squadron were invited to linger and drink toasts 
(Osborne and McDougall 1852:54).  All of these divisions were considered essential to 
maintaining discipline in the Arctic.  These men were living shoulder-to-shoulder: 
maintaining authority required a certain distance between officer and crew, and between 
seaman and marine.
Poking Fun: Authority and Satire
Authors in the IAN used the medium of satire, however, to critique officers and 
other authority figures.  As stated earlier, pieces like this that crossed lines into 
disrespect or potential mutiny would never appear in these pages, but likely existed on 
board.
The “Officer of my Watch” is lampooned as a lazy drunkard, taking advantage of 
the green new sailor to shirk his duties, including standing watch and recording events in 
his logbook (Osborne and McDougall 1852:1-2, 15).  This satire comes from a fictional 
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series of three letters sent from home by a young, inexperienced officer; his social status 
is inferred from the amounts of money spent (£36 on cigars) and mentions of socializing 
with the commodore (Osborne and McDougall 1852:1-2).  Although not targeting any 
specific officer on the expedition, it does reflect common critiques of superior officers of 
the time: lazy and irresponsible.  It may also be read as a critique by a superior of the 
fictional “correspondent” as inexperienced and naïve, not willing and able to learn.
Critique more specific to authority on this squadron’s voyage may be seen in the 
“wentilation” letter (Osborne and McDougall 1852:57).  In it, the crew is universally 
critical of the usefulness of the ventilation system, while the officers are comically 
committed to discovering just the right air flow to keep the Sylvester working properly.
Finally, even the distinguished editors were not immune to using satire as a 
means to critique: they point out meeting a “brother Officer” practicing his clown 
routine in a ravine three miles from the ships (Osborne and McDougall 1852:41).  In this 
instance, the satire is used to discipline (through humiliation) an officer more committed 
to playing the fool than leading with dignity.
One of the most difficult problems faced by the men on board these Arctic 
vessels, as was true on all ships of the time, was maintaining control, through either 
authority or discipline.  Crewmembers far outnumbered officers, and contemporary 
accounts show that dissent, resentment, and even mutiny were far from uncommon on 
board many ships.  In the Arctic vessels, as on most ships, life was isolated and crowded, 
work was difficult, and survival depended on maintaining a sense of order and 
community.  In the Arctic, these factors were compounded by the dark, frigid 
environment, with no sunlight during much of the winter and only rare opportunities to 
send messages home.  Officers and crew alike shared the harsh conditions, including 
cold and hunger (Osborn 1852b:66; Winton 1977:87).  Authority was maintained during 
sailing, wintering, and sledging expeditions through interlocking systems of 
communication, common goals, and morale-boosting amusements.
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Communication
To insure that all officers among the squadron were following orders and 
carrying out tasks as assigned, Captain Austin employed several methods: official 
orders, formal meetings, and dinners. 
Official orders consisted of short letters detailing a course of action, such as one 
example from Captain Austin to Lieutenant Osborn from 6 September 1851 
(Anonymous 1839-1875).  In this missive, Osborn is instructed to take HMS Pioneer
away from the rest of the squadron (including HMS Resolute and HMS Assistance) to 
search for HMS Intrepid, which had not returned from her search for clear sea-lanes 
among the ice.  Osborn was also instructed to take on provisions and supplies sufficient 
for 18 months “in order that they may be prepared to meet an unexpected detention”
(Anonymous 1839-1875:Letter 6 September 1851).  
In other words, this letter highlighted one of the problems with this form of 
communication: since conditions could and often did change rapidly in the Arctic 
(shifting winds, pack ice, etc.), official orders had to be drafted to cover every 
eventuality.  Thus, Austin outlines the course of action to be taken if HMS Intrepid had 
found clear water, where and when to rendezvous if no trace was found, or contingencies 
to return to England if the two steamers became separated from the ships.  Still, even 
these strict orders recognized unforeseen circumstances and trusted the officer’s 
judgment, covered with the phrase “Having full reliance in your prudence intelligence 
and good management I do not deem it necessary to enter into further particulars”
(Anonymous 1839-1875: Letter 6 September 1851).  
Another facet of seafaring life revealed in these orders was the chain of 
command in a squadron consisting of multiple vessels (of varying sizes and types: steam 
and sail both), with multiple levels of command.  Austin, as the captain of HMS 
Resolute, had command both over his vessel and over the senior officers in the rest of the 
squadron.  As recorded in both this letter and his service record, Osborn was 
commissioned as a lieutenant on HMS Resolute, serving in charge of HMS Tender 
Pioneer (Anonymous 1839-1875:Service Record, Letter 6 September 1851).  This also 
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highlights the liminal position of steam ships in the Royal Navy of the time, as these 
“tenders” functioned as assistants to the real ships in the fleet: those that sailed.  This 
subordinate position of the vessels was reflected in the social position of the men 
operating the steam machinery (stokers and engineers), who occupied the lowest rung of 
naval hierarchy, despite receiving higher pay (Chamberlain and Morris 2013:52).  
Official orders were also important in maintaining authority over the crew; an 
incident highlighted in Osborn’s Arctic Leaves illustrated this in an anecdote of HMS
Pioneer being squeezed by the ice: “The men who, whaler-fashion, had, without orders I 
afterwards learnt, brought their clothes on deck, ready to save their little property, stood 
in knots, waiting for directions from the officers” (Osborn 1852b:64).  Waiting for 
orders was a crucial skill to hone in the crew for officers, as without this the men could 
easily abandon ship onto the ice.  For the ship and the expedition, this would be 
disastrous, as the effort of all was needed to run the vessel.
The other avenues by which instructions were given to officers were meetings 
and signal flags.  An example of an official meeting included one mentioned by the 
author of the HMS Resolute journal: “at 8.45 the siglnal [sic] was made for all the 
commanders to assemble on bord [sic] of the resolute” (Unknown 1850-1851:21 May). 
Signal flags were used to give instant messages to the rest of the ships of the squadron, 
such as orders for the steamers to take ships in tow, or to rendezvous with the other 
vessels (Osborn 1852b:206; Unknown 1850-1851:10 June).  
Common Goals
Besides ensuring that officers and men received instructions in duties and tasks 
to be carried out during the voyage, authority in the Arctic depended on ensuring that 
officers and crew were united by common goals.  On the Austin expedition, this was the 
goal to push westward along Franklin’s route (based on his orders from the Admiralty, 
and weather conditions encountered), in order to find or rescue the ships and the men 
aboard (Osborn 1852b:147).  Officers reminded themselves of this goal with frequent 
toasts after dinner (Osborne and McDougall 1852:30).  Among officers, who were 
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generally career Navy men, they had the added incentive of likely knowing friends and 
comrades on the missing Franklin expedition (Osborn 1852b:13).   
In order to bolster these feelings among the crew, who did not have the same 
social connections to the missing Franklin expedition, officers would work side-by-side 
with their men “in laborious duties” both on and off the ship (Osborn 1852b:66, 114).  
This sort of ‘fellow-feeling’ was also encouraged among the ships’ crews, with ships 
cheering each other on during and after a bout of hard work, such as coaling (Unknown 
1850-1851:23 June, 17 August).  In addition, the off-duty watch from a ship would 
frequently assist other vessels in the squadron with various duties, such as coaling, 
hauling through the ice, and cutting docks (Unknown 1850-1851:3 July, 7 July, 2 
August).
However, to maintain authority during the long, difficult Arctic winters, several 
methods were employed to remind the crew of the noble cause for which they were 
suffering.  First, daily and weekly routines allowed officers to address their men as one 
body, especially during “Devine servis” (Unknown 1850-1851:26 May, 7 July, 13 July, 
27 October, 3 November).  
Other opportunities to remind crew of the expedition’s goals were found in the 
publications and other amusements produced by the crew (and supervised by officers).  
For example, lyrics published in the IAN extolled the men to carry on in the strenuous 
task of sledge pulling by reminding them “When friends need our help, we’ll dare it the 
more” (Osborne and McDougall 1852:57).  The IAN also served as a way to distribute 
the fleet’s latest knowledge of Franklin’s fate, based on search expeditions and 
communications with the other vessels wintering in the Arctic the same year (Osborne 
and McDougall 1852:35).  Although acknowledging the discouraging nature of the finds 
(including graves), the account emphasizes the unknown fate of Franklin and the 
possibility of rescue from their current mission.  Thus, hope, patriotism, and enthusiasm 
for work were encouraged.  Finally, this leads into the constant issue facing all these 
Arctic search expeditions: keeping morale high and boredom at bay (Winton 1977:99).  
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Amusements
It was a great fear in nineteenth-century ships that ‘idle hands make the Devil’s 
work;’ this was an especially pressing concern in the Arctic, when the long winter 
months forced crews indoors, with minimal light, for much of the time (Winton 1977:93, 
99).  One method of combating this was to assign more duties.  In addition to the 
imposed routines and daily tasks of cleaning lower decks and personal effects (Osborn 
1852b:118; Unknown 1850-1851:8-9 November), officers would give out busy-work, 
such as producing oakum from worn-out rope, to the crew (Unknown 1850-1851:11 
December). 
At the same time, in order to keep up morale, amusements, including presents, 
liberty visits, newspapers, plays, masked balls, and evening school, were organized by 
officers to keep the crew amused.  The crew enjoyed these entertainments, and eagerly 
entered into “voluntary occupation” onboard (Osborn 1852b:119).  These forms of 
entertainment are to be contrasted with those spontaneous activities generated by the 
crew themselves, such as games of rounders or quoits, dancing, or building snow 
sculptures (Osborn 1852b:66, 118-119; Unknown 1850-1851:1, 3 January).  These 
activities were for “ther own Amusment [sic],” although tacitly sanctioned by those in 
authority giving the men leave to carry out these games (Unknown 1850-1851:1 
January).  Sometimes these activities did not have officer approval, as was the case with 
traps set for foxes around HMS Pioneer and HMS Resolute (Osborn 1852b:138;
Unknown 1850-1851:29 December, 4 January).  
Officers and crewmembers put on separate plays in theatrical productions 
(Osborne and McDougall 1852:10, 31, 53).  The crew produced farces and pantomimes, 
while the officers put on more dramatic or serious fare.  Captain Austin, as the squadron 
leader, arrived at the first production of the Royal Arctic Theatre seated in a sledge 
pulled by eight men, assisted by two “lively servents,” and lit up with Bluelight flares 
(Unknown 1850-1851:9 November).  
The crew of Austin’s Arctic expedition had “presents ishude out”  including 
comforters, mittens, and meerschaum pipes, as well as the traditional rations of grog and 
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hot chocolate (Osborn 1852b:116-117; Unknown 1850-1851:19 June, 6 September).  
Sailors protested if their “traditional” allowances were not respected.  On special 
occasions, like Christmas, the men received a special dinner of fresh beef, plum-
pudding, and cakes (Osborne and McDougall 1852:30).  Officers received similar 
rations, with gifts of gin and gingerbread carried from home at Christmas (Osborne and 
McDougall 1852:29).  After months on rations of boiled pork, biscuit, tea, and lime-
juice, this variety would feel like luxury (Osborn 1852b:153).  In addition, these 
traditional English foods for the holidays would invoke nostalgia in the crew, who were 
“keeping up Cristmas as mery as possable” (Unknown 1850-1851:25 December).  
Maintaining Authority
Throughout all of these daily amusements and special events, authority was 
rigidly maintained.  One example was in visits of crew and officers between ships, such 
as whalers and other expeditions, like that of Captain William Penny, or liberty to walk 
about on the ice as exercise (Unknown 1850-1851:7 July, 26 September, 17 October).  
These liberty walks were circumscribed: if conditions on the ice changed, libertymen 
were recalled to assist in shipboard activities (Unknown 1850-1851:7 July).  Walking 
around off the ship was also constrained to the ice, with specific permission needed for 
any crewmember or officer to travel to land (Unknown 1850-1851:13 October).  For 
example, two men walking landward “alone” (without an officer present) were recalled 
via gun and had their grog ration withheld.  Austin likely feared desertion, even in that 
desolate environment.
In addition, this liberty to walk around as exercise reflected the increasing 
Victorian knowledge that confinement onboard ship was not healthy (Winton 1977:90-
91).  The often humid and stuffy environment below-decks was being recognized as a 
source of disease and general ill health, and the new Sylvester’s Heating Apparatus 
installed in HMS Pioneer was one solution (Lyon and Winfield 2004:232).  
Authority in the Arctic was also reinforced through the two newspapers 
published in the squadron: the Illustrated Arctic News and The Aurora Borealis, the 
former an illustrated journal featuring news and satirical articles, the latter a literary 
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review journal (Osborne and McDougall 1852:5).  However, as has been shown, the IAN
used its articles to promote a healthy comradery among the crew, and to reinforce 
existing structures and models of authority.  For example, one account tells of the editors 
coming across their “brother Officer” three miles (4.8 km) away from the ship among 
the ice, practicing his clown routine for an upcoming production (Osborne and 
McDougall 1852:41).  Their mocking tone is used to chastise the officer (unnamed, but 
onboard a ship with relatively small numbers of people, it would not have been difficult 
to identify the man in question) for being committed to playing the fool.  In short, 
officers were supposed to lead with “precept and example” (Osborn 1852b:66).  
The unfortunate officer referred to above was practicing for one of the numerous 
plays and fancy dress/masked balls held within Austin’s squadron.  On the surface, these 
occasions allowed for a relaxing of the hierarchy, with officers and men alike dressing 
up and acting a different part (Osborne and McDougall 1852:25).  However, authority 
was still rigidly maintained: during the two balls produced on board the HMS Resolute, 
the officers were allowed to stay later than crewmembers, who were required to return to 
their ships and resume duties at 10 PM (Osborne and McDougall 1852:25, 54; Unknown 
1850-1851:5 December).  
Finally, authority was maintained through the use of the Arctic “evening school,”
where crewmembers could learn or improve their reading and writing (Osborn 
1852b:122).  During this period in nineteenth-century Britain, increasing support for 
social reforms combined with evangelical philanthropy in increasing concerns about 
education (McCord et al. 2007:261).  As their social superiors, officers were expected to 
set and enforce that good example (Osborn 1852b:66).  Thus, the school onboard 
Austin’s fleet was seen as a chance for those in authority to sculpt the morals and values 
of the crew, often discussed in patronizing and condescending terms.  For example, a 
struggling sailor might have “an occasional burst of petulance,” while his fellows 
listened to an officer’s tales of Parry’s exploits with “attentive, upturned faces…like 
children to some nursery-tale” (Osborn 1852b:122).  
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As for how much rhetoric and knowledge the crew imbibed while attending 
school, the author of the Resolute journal appears to have attended regularly starting on 
22 November (Unknown 1850-1851:22 November).  The classes, starting at 6 PM on 
weeknights, did not affect the author’s handwriting, which was fair.  However, it is 
interesting to note temporary spelling errors seen shortly after school began (misspelling 
usual as “usuil”) until corrected again (Unknown 1850-1851:26-27 November).  No 
other significant changes can be seen, although the author’s account may have been 
rewritten after beginning school attendance.  Unfortunately, this will remain an 
unknown.
Fear: Tuto et sine metu
Underlying currents of fear are seen throughout the IAN articles, ranging from 
fear of physical harm from nature, like bear attacks or frostbite to more psychological, 
like fear of being forgotten and abandoned by family, or losing a sweetheart to another 
man (Osborne and McDougall 1852:6, 21, 39, 57).  Fears among officers, often left 
unspoken but visible between the lines of text, revolved around madness and rebellion 
amongst the crew (Coppinger 2011:121).
The IAN attempted to stave off these fears by reassuring readers that “our Chair 
will be there, and our name will not be forgotten” (Osborne and McDougall 1852:21).  
Other tactics included distraction, while satires like the Correspondent’s Letter to his 
“Much loved Penelope” allowed a safe outlet for sailors to express those fears (Osborne 
and McDougall 1852:38). In order to quell worries about mutiny and insanity, officers 
enforced busy-work and maintaining the veneer of authority with their subordinates, as 
discussed previously. 
Conflict and Hidden Tensions
Living in confined areas, with little variation in routine, constant contact with the 
same personalities, and no chance for privacy must have led to conflicts among the 
squadron.  For example, even walking three miles away and hiding in a ravine was no 
guarantee of privacy (Osborne and McDougall 1852:41).   However, in their mission to 
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uplift spirits and prove that happiness could exist in the Arctic Circle, the editors did not 
publish pieces directly confronting conflicts and other tensions.
However, reading between the lines allows the researcher to discern various 
micro-aggressions occurring in a sailor’s daily life.  Among the ships, the competing 
newspapers and social events put on by officers show conflict.  The IAN editors criticize 
their shipmates for not participating in civic pursuits by lamenting the lack of stories 
submitted to the Editor’s Box (Osborne and McDougall 1852:21).  At the same time, 
power conflicts among the crew about who was published, and why, led the editors to 
issue a statement calling for their shipmates to “concede to us the right of rejecting 
without comment, any Publications adjudged to be ill adapted for the Columns of our 
Periodical” (Osborne and McDougall 1852:11).  This simmering conflict between 
crewmembers was also deflected by the call for pseudonyms, to avoid cries of 
favoritism.  
Officers among the four ships of the squadron also experienced tension in their 
social circles, most notably over dinner invitations and attendance at events.  This caused 
the officers of HMS Pioneer (of whom Sherard Osborn was the leader) to cry “[we], 
(who by the bye are always At Home) also gave an entertainment the same evening”
(Osborne and McDougall 1852:29).  The At Home, a regular event hosted by Capt. 
Austin of HMS Resolute, was cited by Pioneer’s officers as an example of their 
unflagging “team spirit” and willingness to work with their colleagues on board the other 
vessels after they were criticized for hosting their own separate event.
Racism in Black and White
Racism was clearly ingrained in depictions of the Other in the IAN.  From the 
Chinese man portrayed in stocks to the avaricious messmate “of the Jewish Persuasion,”
minority groups were not depicted favorably, highlighting the casual racism of the 19th 
century sailor (Osborne and McDougall 1852:6, 16).  The races of crewmen on board the 
squadron’s four ships are not known by the researcher, however, an “Esquimaux” man, 
Erasmus York, did accompany the squadron (Osborne and McDougall 1852:19).  Like 
earlier depiction of the natives inhabiting the Arctic regions, York is characterized as 
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childlike, unable to distinguish fantasy (a play) from reality (David 2000:134; Osborne 
and McDougall 1852:19).  The depiction of York also reflects at the same time the 
Victorian fear of the Other’s ‘savage’ sexuality, fearing uncontrolled sexual appetitites 
would lead to a moral decline in the nation: as York searches through casks trying to 
find “the lovely English Koonah” (Osborne and McDougall 1852:19).  Among sailors in 
the Arctic, those fears generally took the form of either fearing outbreaks of “sodomy”
among lonely crewmembers, or crewmen going “native” after contact with indigenous 
women.
Female Roles: Sweethearts and Actors
At the same time, the British sailors were contending with lack of female 
companionship in the Arctic.  Coping mechanisms for plays with female roles were 
found by having men cross-dressing as women, such as “fair Lydia Whiffles” and  
Eudiga and Ulrica (Osborne and McDougall 1852:19, 56).  “Lydia,” whose stage 
appearance took place after an intermission of poetry and drop scenes, was performed by 
an unnamed crew member.  In contrast, the roles of Eudiga and Ulrica were taken by 
officers, Mr. McDougall and Mr. Pearse.  Unnamed crew also dressed as women for the 
fancy dress balls hosted, where female roles for dancing were required (Osborne and 
McDougall 1852:23).  The owner of the manuscript, Admiral Hamilton, dressed for the 
Grand Bal Masqué as a woman in a red, flounced dress.  These “ladies” would be in 
much demand as dancing partners, although men also danced together (Osborne and 
McDougall 1852:26).
At the time, Hamilton was 21 years old; as a younger man, this might have been 
seen as his duty to improve morale by playing a necessary part. As his later rank attests, 
this also appears to have had no effect on his career.  Unfortunately, lack of data and 
descriptions from these men mean no more conclusions can be drawn.
However, in ordinary life, sailors still mourned the absence of sweethearts and 
wives, wishing that they could lay “her gentle hand in thine” (Osborne and McDougall 
1852:33).  Nostalgia for the ideal home life featured heavily in these expressed longings 
for family, leading to the next theme.
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Nostalgia: Home and the Holidays
Nostalgia and longing for “the sweet Village Church,” “family Table,” or “the 
amusement of the domestic Circle” permeates satirical accounts, descriptions of holiday 
events, and almost every aspect of life depicted in the IAN (Osborne and McDougall 
1852:9).  The scenes of a sailor’s domestic life were given a rosy-tinted gloss in all of 
these accounts, as petty conflicts at home were forgotten in the miserable present.  In 
addition, since professional sailors, constantly at sea, would have had limited experience 
with family life, these “nostalgic” reminisces may have been more similar to fantasy and 
ideals than reality.
Such longing nostalgia was one option for coping: other sailors doubtless turned 
to drink: “we became thirsty souls and drank deeply of the intoxicating draught called 
eight-penny” (Osborne and McDougall 1852:26).  Even today, drinking remains 
problematic on isolated polar stations (Hale 2015).
Nostalgia was connected to these sailor’s reality by assiduously recreating 
(however possible) continuity with British traditions, including celebrations of 
Christmas and HRH Prince Albert’s birthday, singing of patriotic tunes, and 
consumption of treats brought from England (Osborne and McDougall 1852:10, 29). 
Captain Austin, the leader of the squadron, attempted to recreate familiar domestic 
scenes with “Evenings at Home,” filled with familiar songs (Osborne and McDougall 
1852:18).
Community: Common Goals
Events such as the Evening at Home also served another purpose: strengthening 
the community.  Faced with constant daily reminders of the harsh environment, these 
sailors exerted social pressure on each other to conform to common goals and pull 
together, a sentiment eloquently expressed in the metaphor of sledging, a backbreaking 
task (Osborne and McDougall 1852:44).  As expressed early in the winter: “we depend 
entirely on each other…it behoves [sic] us all to contribute what we can to the common 
weal” (Osborne and McDougall 1852:9). 
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In addition, the crew and officers continued to remind each other of the purpose 
for their suffering: to find Franklin and his men (Osborne and McDougall 1852:30, 35-
36).  This zeal to find Franklin was also exerted by drawing parallels between Franklin 
and their expedition: it was easy to imagine their own squadron vanishing without a 
trace in the blowing snow.  
Historical treatises were also used to reinforce community goals, as in Osborne’s 
fable of an 18th-century expedition searching for another group of lost comrades 
(Osborne and McDougall 1852:45-46).  In the tale, the searchers are so engrossed by 
their own quest for glory and discovery that they passed near their lost comrades, 
abandoning them to death.  The moral of the tale was clear: remember why we are here 
and stay true, as you’d want your shipmates to search for you.
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CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This research has discussed HMS Pioneer’s voyages, captained by Lieutenant 
Sherard Osborn under Captain Horatio Austin and Edward Belcher, respectively, on the 
two Arctic expeditions of its short Royal Navy career.  By situating the auxiliary steam 
topsail schooner in the historical context of the British push for Arctic exploration and
concern over Sir John Franklin’s missing expedition, the choices and turmoil of her 
officers and crew can be examined in the light of changing technology.
HMS Pioneer’s significance rests on its unique place in this cultural and 
technological shift.  On the one hand, Arctic voyages were a long-standing tradition of 
the island nation, with a history of exploration stretching back to the sixteenth century. 
However, contemporary shifts in the way ships were propelled, with the advent of 
increasingly reliable and efficient oscillating steam engines and the durable, damage-
resistant screw propeller allowed the use of innovative technologies to venture into the 
frozen north.  
Although contemporary opinion was divided on the usefulness of steam in the 
Arctic, partially based on the failures of earlier steam power such as Ross’ voyage in 
HMS Victory and Franklin’s missing HMS Erebus and HMS Terror, a new generation 
of naval officers was rising.  Lieutenant Sherard Osborn, only 27 years old at the time of 
the Austin expedition, was an ambitious young naval officer eager to show the utility of 
Arctic steam.  Indeed, these hopes were justified with the successful use of HMS 
Pioneer and HMS Intrepid, serving as towing consorts for their lumbering sailing 
companions in uncertain Arctic breezes. Steam vessels had the advantage of being able 
to travel in whichever direction was open, even backwards, without relying on uncertain 
winds.  Steam-power also allowed more focus on ramming and otherwise forcing ice 
lanes open, something that sails simply could not accomplish effectively.  This shift was 
visible throughout the Navy: by the Crimean War in 1854, steam vessels were 
indispensable, and the reliance upon engine power continues to the present day. 
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Thus, HMS Pioneer serves as a valuable case-study on this formative period in 
nautical archaeology and maritime history, when innovative new technologies met a 
conservative institution.  This process was thus examined in four main areas: sails and 
rigging, propeller and engine, heating and coal, and daily life.  Based on contemporary 
accounts including official reports and art, popular books, illustrated newspapers, and 
personal journals, supplemented by comparative analyses of similar archaeological 
material, a full view of the structure and daily life on board HMS Pioneer was 
reconstructed.  
However, even with the long-held interest the Arctic has held for academics, 
there are still significant areas of research.  One question raised by this research has been 
the uncertainty of data.  Even historical ships, with their wealth of information recorded 
by contemporaries, are uncertain territory for the nautical archaeologist attempting to 
map technological changes, as has been shown.  Further research, therefore, is always 
enhanced by comparison and contrast with quantifiable data from archaeological 
sources.  Although archaeological data has its own taphonomic biases, it, along with 
other avenues of comparative research, such as textual analyses, can provide a valuable 
counterbalance (Driver p. 626).
Aiding in this need for comparative archaeological research, changing global 
climate conditions are rendering the areas where these ships were lost open to direct 
investigation and the potential for new discoveries in previously inaccessible areas.  The 
most recent and prominent example, of course, was the discovery of HMS Erebus by 
Parks Canada in 2014 (Parks Canada 2016; Patel 2015).  Previously, popular thought 
had assumed these vessels were ruined by shifting winter and summer ice-thaw cycles 
and other taphonomic forces; the discovery of the nearly complete hull opens the way to 
more intense research in the area.  Questions raised in this thesis, such as adaptations or 
repairs made en route to HMS Pioneer’s oscillating engine, may finally receive answers.
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Table 2.  Mast-Framing Dimensions
In Feet
Lower Mast 
Cap
Length Breadth Depth
Fore 2.48 1.91 0.38
Main 3.08 2.44 0.49
Mizzen 2.28 1.61 0.35
Space between 
lower mast and 
topmast at cap
Fore 0.32
Main 0.41
Mizzen 0.29
Upper Mast 
Cap
Length Breadth Depth
Fore * * 0.37 *Assumed to be the 
same as lower mast 
cap
Main * * 0.47
Mizzen * * 0.34
Length Width Thickness
Bowsprit Cap 2.05 0.34 0.33
Hounds Length Breadth
Fore 3.68 0.64
Main 3.84 0.81
Mizzen 2.72 0.58
Crosstrees Breadth Depth Foremost 
Length
Aftermost Length
Fore 0.39 0.26 8.9 10.9
Main 0.51 0.34 11.6 13.6
Mizzen 0.35 0.24 8.4 10.4
Bolster Width Depth
Fore 0.47 0.41
Main 0.59 0.52
Mizzen 0.44 0.39
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Table 2 Continued
In Meters
Lower Mast 
Cap
Length Breadth Depth
Fore 0.7559 0.58217 0.11582
Main 0.93878 0.74371 0.14935
Mizzen 0.69494 0.49073 0.10668
Space between 
lower mast and 
topmast at cap
Fore 0.09754
Main 0.12497
Mizzen 0.08839
Upper Mast 
Cap
Length Breadth Depth
Fore * * 0.11278 *Assumed to be the 
same as lower mast 
cap
Main * * 0.14326
Mizzen * * 0.10363
Length Width Thickness
Bowsprit Cap 0.62484 0.10363 0.10058
Hounds Length Breadth
Fore 1.12166 0.19507
Main 1.17043 0.24689
Mizzen 0.82906 0.17678
Crosstrees Breadth Depth Foremost 
Length
Aftermost Length
Fore 0.11887 0.07925 2.71272 3.32232
Main 0.15545 0.10363 3.53568 4.14528
Mizzen 0.10668 0.07315 2.56032 3.16992
Bolster Width Depth
Fore 0.14326 0.12497
Main 0.17983 0.1585
Mizzen 0.13411 0.11887
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Table 3.  Bowsprit and Other Headgear Spars
In Feet
Whole 
length
Housed Steeve 
(degrees)
Large 
Diameter
Heel 
Diameter
Head
Diameter
Bowsprit 28.8 8.2 18 1.44 1.44 0.97
Length Large 
Diameter
Small 
Diameter
Flying 
Jibboom
Jibboom 27.4 0.41 7.3
Length Width Location 
(from the 
fore side 
of cap)
Saddle 0.72 0.2 9.13
Length Large 
Diameter
Small 
Diameter
Dolphin-
striker
7.5 0.29 0.2
In Meters
Whole 
length
Housed Steeve 
(degrees)
Large 
Diameter
Heel 
Diameter
Head
Diameter
Bowsprit 8.7782
4
2.49936 5.4864 0.43891 0.43891 0.29566
Length Large 
Diameter
Small 
Diameter
Flying 
Jibboom
Jibboom 8.3515
2
0.12497 0 2.22504
Length Width Location 
(from the 
fore side 
of cap)
Saddle 0.2194
6
0.06096 2.78282
Length Large 
Diameter
Small 
Diameter
Dolphin-
striker
2.286 0.08839 0.06096
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Table 5.  Standing Rigging
In Feet Shrouds Rope size 
(diameter)*
Deadeyes**
*based on Brady 
(1848)
Fore 0.24 0.52
**based on 
Kipping (1853)
Main 0.24 0.54
Mizzen 0.18 0.52
Topmast 
Shrouds
Rope size 
(diameter)*
Deadeyes** Length of 
futtock 
shrouds*
Fore topmast 0.15 0.27 3
Main topmast 0.15 0.27 3.8
Mizzen 
topmast
0.12 0.27 2.8
Stays Rope size 
(diameter)*
Fore 0.33
Main 0.33
Mizzen 0.21
Fore topmast 0.23
Main topmast 0.23
Mizzen 
topmast
0.13
Fore 
topgallant
0.11
Standing jib 0.15
Martingale 0.2
Backstays Rope size 
(diameter)*
Fore topmast 0.23
Main topmast 0.23
Mizzen 
topmast
0.19
Martingale 
backropes
0.12
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Table 5 Continued
In Meters Shrouds Rope size 
(diameter)*
Deadeyes**
Fore 0.07315 0.1585
Main 0.07315 0.16459
Mizzen 0.05486 0.1585
Topmast 
Shrouds
Rope size 
(diameter)*
Deadeyes** Length of 
futtock 
shrouds*
Fore topmast 0.04572 0.0823 0.9144
Main topmast 0.04572 0.0823 1.15824
Mizzen 
topmast
0.03658 0.0823 0.85344
Stays Rope size 
(diameter)*
Fore 0.10058
Main 0.10058
Mizzen 0.06401
Fore topmast 0.0701
Main topmast 0.0701
Mizzen 
topmast
0.03962
Fore 
topgallant
0.03353
Standing jib 0.04572
Martingale 0.06096
Backstays Rope size 
(diameter)*
Fore topmast 0.0701
Main topmast 0.0701
Mizzen 
topmast
0.05791
Martingale 
backropes
0.03658
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Table 6.  Running Rigging
In Feet Lifts Blocks at 
cap (sister)
Block at yard-
arm (single)
Throat 
Halliard
Blocks*
Fore 0.37 Fore 0.31
Main 0.4 Main 0.31
Foretop 0.48 0.27 Mizzen 0.32
Maintop 0.48 0.24 Peak
Halliard
Blocks*
Foretopgal
lant
0.16 Fore 0.31
Braces Blocks at 
yard-arm 
(single)
Main 0.31
Fore 0.37 Mizzen 0.27
Main 0.48 Boom 
topping-
lift
Blocks*
Foretop 0.37 Mizzen 0.32
Maintop 0.4 Boom 
sheet
Double 
block
Single 
block
Foretop-
gallant
0.19 Mizzen 0.27 0.27
Halliards/
Tyes
Tye block 
(on yard)
Fly block
Foretop 0.42 0.58
Maintop 0.42 0.48
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Table 6 Continued
In 
Meters
Lifts Blocks at 
cap (sister)
Block at yard-
arm (single)
Throat 
Halliard
Blocks*
Fore 0.11278 Fore 0.09449
Main 0.12192 Main 0.09449
Foretop 0.1463 0.0823 Mizzen 0.09754
Maintop 0.1463 0.07315 Peak
Halliard
Blocks*
Foretop-
gallant
0.04877 Fore 0.09449
Braces Blocks at 
yard-arm 
(single)
Main 0.09449
Fore 0.11278 Mizzen 0.0823
Main 0.1463 Boom 
topping-
lift
Blocks*
Foretop 0.11278 Mizzen 0.09754
Maintop 0.12192 Boom 
sheet
Double 
block
Single 
block
Foretop-
gallant
0.05791 Mizzen 0.0823 0.0823
Halliards/
Tyes
Tye block 
(on yard)
Fly block
Foretop 0.12802 0.17678
Maintop 0.12802 0.1463
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Table 7.  Tonnages and Characteristics of Austin Expedition Vessels, 1850 (Osborn 
1852b:32-35)
Name of 
vessel
Length Tonnage Propulsion system Crew size 
(Men/Officers)
Intrepid 150 feet 
(45.7 m)
400 tons 
burthen
Screw propeller, two 
engines of 30 
horsepower each; three-
masted schooner rig
30/5
Pioneer 150 feet 
(45.7 m)
400-500
tons
Screw propeller, two 
engines of 30 
horsepower each; three-
masted schooner rig
30/5
Assistance 100 feet* 
(30.5 m)
unknown Sail-bark rigged 60/25
Resolute 100 feet* 
(30.5 m)
700 tons 
fully loaded
Sail-bark rigged 60/25
*length estimated from Osborn's commen that the steamers were 50 feet longer than the 
ships, although they carried only half as many men (Osborn 1852b:47).
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Table 8.  Speed Estimates of HMS Pioneer Unburdened and Towing HMS Resolute
(Osborn 1852b:57-58).
Average Speed Average Speed Towing
HMS Pioneer 5 mph (8 kph) 3 mph (4.8 kph)
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APPENDIX B: FIGURES






